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I. THE CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR
1.

THE SOCIAL CLEAVAGE

HE
------ present military insurrection against the legitimate Spanish government is an attempt to destroy
those forces which have undertaken to make Spain
a modern, progressive nation.
Not so long ago Spain ruled parts of the United State8
and large territories to the south of it. Spanish explorers
and conquerors had pushed into the 8€Ven seas carrying
Spanish influence and culture with them. Spain was mistress of vast domains., a mighty and weathy power. Since
then she has sunk to the level of a third-rate nation. Her
people are as enterprising as in the heyday of her glory.
Her geographical position on the Atlantic and Mediterranean is as strategic and favorable. Her natura.} resources
are greater than those of Italy . Yet she has become a
miserably poor, backward, unhappy country. Somebody
must .be responsible for this stagnation and 'retrogression.
I t must be the people who have ruled Spain in recent
centuries~ And those very ruling classes were the initiators
and are now the backbone of the revolt against the Madrid
government. While England made the Industrial Revolution and France her great political . revolution, the landlords of Spain refused to let the clock go forward. In
many respects Spain is still medieval, the Czarist Russia
of 1937.
. The bloodless overthrow of the monarchy in 1931 was
an effort. to expel the Middle Ages and to introduce the
twentieth century into Spain. The enlightened bourgeoisie,
the intellectuals, the workingmen, and the peasants banded
together to rid the country of the incubus of medievalism.
But though the physically subnormal and ment{tlly disintegrated House of Bourbon, incapable of the slightest resistance, allowed itself to be SW€pt into the dustbin of
history, the republic was too weak, perhaps because too
indecisive, to dislodge ' the social stratum on which the
monarchy had rested. The feudal barons accepted the form
of the republic in order the better to destroy its content.
They obstructed every reform which might have dissipated
social unrest and raised the standard of living. The most
burning need was the alleviation of the lot of tke peasants,

T

3

who were serfs in fact if not in name. I visited Andalusian
villages in 1934 where no peasant owned land. Whole
farming communities had not a single horse or cow or sheep
or pig. In the village of Pueblo del Rio, half an hour from
the much-advertised tourist city of Seville, a peasant said
to me: "I ate my cat today and it was the first time I had
tasted meat in six months." The farmers lived in mud huts
with earthen floors and no tables. Indeed, tables would have
been totally superfluous, for they never sat down to a meal.
They subsisted on an unvaried diet of lentils, black sugarless coffee, and bread. Tens of thousands of Spanish peasants have for decades lived in a state of semi-starvation.
Whole villages feed on boiled grasses ' and roots. As one
moves through the countryside, one can see hundreds. of
families in cave dwellings. Those are their permanent homes.
It is a well-known fact that this low, almost animal existence has reduced many country folk to the mental level
of cretins and morons.
The republic came into being to alter these conditions.
It found Spain 72 per cent agricultural-a token of under. development and backwardness. It was a country of idle
rich and idle poor, of big landlords and poverty-stricken
peasants. One per cent of the population owned 51.5 per
cent of its soil, whereas 40 per cent owned no' land at all.
In the June, 1925, issue of the International Labor
Review, Dr. Fernando de los Rios, later Spanish Ambassador to the United States, published the results of
his investigations into agrarian conditions in the entire
registration area, which covers one-third of Spain. In
Galicia, he wrote, the peasantry "is not simply poor but
almost destitute." This province, with an area of 2,900,000
hectares, counted 2,500,000 holdings, little more than
one .hectare per family, whereas between ten and twelve hectares are required to support a family. The registration
area of 17,000,000 hectares was divided into 6,130,000
holdings-about three hectares per farm-but 514 landowners in the province of Caceres owned 566,415 hectares.
The spread between the upper and lower classes was
vast. Millions had not even a tiny patch for the cultivation
of potatoes, but in 1936 the Duke of Medinaceli owned
195,680 acres, the Duke of Penaranda 104,345 acres, the
Duke of Alba 89,625 acres, the Marquis de Comillas 42,795
acres, the Duke of Lerma 25,560 acres, and so on down
a long list of titled and untitled landowners who received
sufficient income
, from their ill-managed estates· to lead
4

luxurious lives in Madrid or Paris or London while the
hired labor on their lands eked out a humiliating existence.
In several provinces of Spain laws existed which prohibited
the use of machinery. With plenty of water in rivers and
whole provinces requiring irrigation, nothing was done to
in troduce it.
History assigned to the Spanish Republic the task of
removing the taboo on progress. It had to increase agricultural output, making the farmer a bigger consumer of
city goods and thus stimulating the growth of domestic
industries. By solving the land problem Spain could become
an advanced and prosperous nation.
2.

REACTION FIGHTS THE REPUBLIC

These matters were urgent. Yet the Republicans proceeded slowly and cautiously. They were aware of the
opposition they would meet from the landlords. I discussed
this question in March, 1934, with Manuel Azafia, who had
been Prime Minister of Spain between October, 1931, and
September, 1933. "Agrarian change," he said, "is the most
important issue facing the. republic." In office, however,
it took him a year and a half to draft a new land law. The
explanation he gave was that the estate owners offered
so much resistance to his political and religious reforms
that he did not dare to venture into the more dangerous,
because more fundamental, realm of economic reform. The
result? In April, 1934, three years after the founding of
the republic, fewer than ten thousand peasants had received land from the state.
While Azalia was in power he raised the wages of fann
laborers by means of legislation. The moment he was
ousted by the reactionaries, wages were lowered. The Republicans had undertaken public works to reduce unemployment. Their successors in office discontinued them. On
March 7, 1934, Largo Caballero, later Prime lVlinister of
Spain, said to me: "Spain under the republic received the
best social legislation in the world. But the present Lerroux Cabinet has made it a dead letter." What a Republican ministry did was immediately undone by -the disguised
monarchists who superseded it. "I tied myself with legal
bonds," Azalia said to me in 1934, "yet even so the rights
. objected." The aristocrats, landlords, and army chiefs did
not realize that moderate reforms, by mollifying the peasantry, could save ~he ruling groups from extinction. They
5

closed their ears to the call which had "summoned the republic into existence to solve Spain's problems.
Strangely enough, Spain's small industrialist class supported the reactionary position taken by the landlords.
The industrialists should have welcomed a land reform
which would create a home market for their goods~ But
they believed that more than economics was involved. They
feared that the granting of land to the peasantry would
rob the owning classes of political power. The manufacturers, therefore, who should have encouraged the republic
in its attempts to stage a peaceful revolution which would
have enriched the country, actually leagued themselves
with the backward-looking landlords to prevent all amelioration and reform.
The purpose for which the republic was founded was
thus thwarted. The monarchists threatened to capture the
republic and subject it to their will. The people lost faith
in the "new regime. In the villages of Andalusia I asked
the peasants in 1934 what the repuhlic had given them.
They said it had given them nothing. One woman cried
out: "Damn the republic!"
"Wha t is your hope?" I inquired.
"We are waiting for death," they"replied.
"Why don't you seize the land?" I t}:len asked.
"The answer is in two words," a political leader in the
village of Pueblo del Rio replied. "Guardia Civil." They
feared the police. The rights were ruling by means of terror. They were guided by principles antagonistic to the
republic, its constitution, and fundamental law.
In October, 1934, the resentment of the workers exploded. A rev6l t broke out in the Asturias mining region
in northern Spain. The reactionary government brought
in Moorish troops from Africa and quelled the insurrection. "The rights suppressed the Asturias rising," Azafia
said to me subsequently, "with a cruelty unparalleled in
history."
Disaffection spread throughout the country. The economic situation went from bad to worse. "The financial
position of the nation," Azafia declared, "was calamitous,
and the entire social order was in a state of collapse." The
sorely tried millions of city and farm laborers despaired
of politics and of parliamentary government. Even reformist Socialists, whose entire careers had been built on a
denial of revolution, began to see that Spain's only salva6

tion lay in a violent ejection of the monarchists who had
emasculated the republic.
Bourgeois and Socialist Republicans now realized that if
no ray of hope appeared to the village and city masses an
explosion of popular wrath would engulf them all. There
was a danger of spontaneous peasant and urban riots
which would be drowned in blood by the ruthless authorities,
unless the Republicans showed themselves capable of effective political action. Spurred by this necessity and taught
by the sorry fate of the divided democracies of Germany,
Austria, and other countries, Spanish Republicans of all
hues formed a united front and went to the polls on February 16, 1936, to elect a new parliament. l\luch to their
own surprise, the Popular Front succeeded in winning a
majority of the Cortes seats. The present Loyalist government is the child of that legally elected Cortes.
3. THE POPULAR FRONT IN POWER
In the elections of February 16 and in several supplementary pons which took place on l\farch 1, the Popular
Front fusion -ticket received 4,206,156 votes against
3,783,601 for the right parties and 681,047 for the center
parties. (After the insurrection some of the center sympathized with the Loyalists.) The division of seats in the
Cortes was: 258 for the Popular Front; 152 for the Right;
62 for the center.
The Popular Front woIl; this victory even though innumerable Anarchists, who form the largest party supporting the Loyalists, in conson~nce with their antipolitical principles, stayed away from the polls. It won
despite the fact that before and on election day a reactionary government was in power in a country where electioneering terror is a fine art. It won against the open and
vigorous opposition of the higher Catholic clergy. During
the election campaign the Bishop of Barcelona, for instance, declared: "It is sinful to vote for the Popular
Front. A vote- for the conservative candidate is a vote 'for
Christ." The Archbishop of Toledo urged his followers to
"vote for the Catholic candidates, for you will thereby
please the Holy Father."
N otwithstandjng these formidable handicaps the Popular Front carried off the victory, and immediately thereafter a new Cabinet was set up which consisted entirely of
liberal bourgeois Republicans but enjoyed the parliamentary support of the Socialists and Communists. Manuel
7

Azafia became Prime Minister once again. The attitude
of the reactionaries to the Popular Front victory was expressed by General Franco himself in an interview at
Tetuan with the London News Chronicle (July 29, 1936).
"What about the February elections?" the correspondent
asked. "Didn't they represent the national will?" "Elections never do," Franco replied.
The new Azafia government was lifted into office on a
wave of widespread peasant and labor discontent. It had
amanda te to rule more radically than its predecessors.
The people were insisting on more drastic measures to improve their lot. But the reactionaries remained blind to
these facts, and the second Azafia government accordingly
conceived of its role as that of buffer between the impatient masses and the recalcitrant landlords with their
lay and other allies.
Azafia is a man of great culture and integrity. Educated in the famous Escorial monastery, he became a
prominent jurist and a leading intellectual. Author of seyeral plays, three novels, a story of his youth entitled "The
Garden of the l\lonks," which is one of the gems of the
Spanish language, "and a translation from the English of
Borrow's "The Bible in Sp~in," he is so balanced a combina tion of the intellectual and the politician that he could
easily forsake the one role for the other. When I interviewed him on April 4, 1936, my final question was, "Will
you be here a year from now when I come back?"
"Of course," he replied, "unless I get bored with
politics."
Boredom and excessive excitement may achieve the same
result in the intellectual; but when he became Prime Minister again in February, 1936, Azafia occupied a strong
position. His strength lay in the fact that although he
was an ally of the Socialists and Communists, he was
simultaneously the last hope of the bourgeoisie. The owning classes did not wish to unseat him because he was a
firm bulwark ' against socialism, and the workers and peasants supported him because they were still too weak for a
direct struggle with the bourgeoisie. Tactically this position was good, but it condemned "Azafia to a policy of no
initiative, for in himself he had no political strength. His
party, consisting of government office-holders, professional
men, and enlightened business peopl~, was numerically
small. Because of Spain's economic underdevelopment the
middle class was too puny to serve as buffer or bridge
8

between the oppressed lower classes and the oppressing
upper classes. There was therefore little contact or understanding between them. Azana tried to help by acting as
little as possible, but he probably came too late. While the
landlords were as unyielding and stubborn as 'ever, the
peasants soon began to help themselves. "Hunger and unemployment," wrote the Madrid correspondent of the conservative London Times, "are driving the inhabitants [of
rural districts] to despair."
The movement started in the large and poor province
of Caceres. Here, during Azana's first term as Prime Minister, several thousand Yunteros, or owners of a yoke of
mules but no land, had been allowed to rent part of the
unused estates of large feudal barons. In 1934-35, however, while the Gil Robles-Lerroux reactionary forces controlled the government, these Y wnteros were again driven
off. After the Popula:r Front electoral victory the peasants felt encouraged, and in the province of Caceres they
. presented the provincial branch of the federal Institute" of
Agrarian Reform with an ultimatum: If you do not give
us land in forty-eight hours, we will take it. On March 7,
1936, accordingly, Senor de 1a Fuente, chief of the Caceres
branch of the institute, published a circular asking proprietors to rent some land to landless peasants. When I
talked with De la Fuente in Caceres in April, he had received not a single reply. Five days after the institute's
circular to -the proprietors the peasants therefore marched
with their mules and plows to the landlords' estates and
each marked off for himself a modest parcel which he sub-:
sequently tilled and paid rent for.
In the neighboring province of Badajoz, hard by the
Portuguese frontier, economic conditions were even worse
than in Caceres. The- region had 702,000 inhabitants
(175,000 families), of whom between 80 and 90 per cent
lived on the soiL Land ownership was heavily concentrated;
2,946 proprietors owned 40 per cent of the total s:urf ace
of the province. Practically no proprietors fell in the class
owning between two and fifty hectares. There was, in other
words, no rural middle class. There were the holders of
vast latifundia and the impecunious Yunteros. On March
25 in 150 villages of Badajoz, the peasants assembled at
5 a. m. with their stock and their implements and solemnly
drew lots to decide which Ywnteros were to go to what
esta tes. No violence or resistance marked this oc~asion.
The authorities were now Socialist and they confined the
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Guardia Civil to barracks. The Yunteros plo~ed a furrow
around their individual plots and then and there made
public announcement of their occupation of the land. The
land still belonged to the proprietors and had been taken
merely in tenancy. The rent was paid to the owner through
the Institute of Agrarian Reform, which legalized the
Y wnteros' action.
In this manner, within two months, 41,499 Yunteros had
been settled on 1,502 estates covering 105,090 hectares in
Badajoz, while 24,702 Yunteros had been settled on 948
estates covering 59,621 hectares in Caceres. In other provinces the land reform had scarcely got under way by the
spring of 1936.
In April I discussed the new situation with Prime Minister Azana. "Might not these changes on the land," I ventured, "strengthen the ca pitalist regime in the cities by
creating a richer peasant market for industrial commodities ?'~
"Yes," he frankly replied. "They will strengthen the urban bourgeoisie. But that bourgeoisie is not anti-republican."
Senor Ruiz-Funez, Azana's Minister of Agriculture,
took the same view. No land, he said, had been confiscated
by the new regime. The Y unteros were only being settled
as tenant farmers. In 1936 the government's plan was to
allocate land to 80,000 farmers. "This method of land reform, by renting land to Ywnteros," Ruis-Funez said
to me, "will weaken the tendency toward socialism." That,
as the left bourgeois Republicans saw it, would be the most
salutary effect of'the Yuntero movement.
I wished to learn for myself whether the hopes of Azana
and Ruiz-Funez were likely to be fulfilled. During and after
the period when the land reform was at its height I traveled 2,000 kilometers through Caceres, Badaj oz; and six
other provinces in an attempt to feel the pulse of the peasantry. The advent of the Popular Front government and
especially the new era in land tenure had stirred them profoundly. On the plaza of the little town of Caceres I accosted three woolly mountaineer Yunteros dressed in dark,
patched corduroy suits and big black sombreros. They
came from the village of Malpartida de Caceres, where
6,000 hectares of land had been distributed among the
peasants. "We were in a cage before," one of them said to
me, "and now we are out." They would harvest a crop in
1937 and until then they would live by hauling. All of
10

them were Socialists. They did not know what the land
would cost them, whether they would keep it, or whether
they would get more. But they had land, and they were
pleased. "It is a beginning," the youngest said.
En route to Trujillo, where Francisco Pizarro, the conqueror of Peru was born, I stopped on a road that led
through the estate of the Count of Torrearas. A man was
plowing. With my friends of the Institute of Agrarian
Reform, 1 got out of the automobile and beckoned to him.
In true Spanish fashion he yelled to us to meet him halfway. He was Facundo Martin, a Yuntero who had received
land for cultivation at a rental. He said that his situation
was better, that the Yunteros who had got land were satisfied. It was not his land, he said. "I only work here. 1
would like to have my own farm. I work myself to death to
earn enough to pay the high rent." The rent would amount
to between one-quarter and one-third of his crop. Facundo
was twenty-four years 'old and unmarried. "Life isn't good
enough to marry," he said.
At Barcarrota, a village of white, smooth-faced homes
in Badaj oz, 1 chanced upon a Socialist meeting. About
300 men and-women were assembled at the Casa del Pueblo,
or people's house, to hear a speaker who had not arrived.
1 was offered the opportunity of putting questions to the
audience and I took advantage of it avidly. I mounted a
rude wooden platform and said:
"Why are you Socialists?"
"Because we want liberty," one woman replied.
"Because we don't want to starve," another added.
"Don't you eat enough?" I asked. The reply was a
burst of laughter. I suggested that those who ate meat
twice a week, raise their hands. No hand went up.
"Who eats meat once a week?" Not a hand went up. A
woman rose and explained that the regular diet of most
of them consisted of vegetable soup, black coffee,-breadwhen they had it-and sometimes sardines.
"Don't the children have milk?" I inquired. Several
mothers with babies on their arms, pointed to their breasts.
"Yes," one said, "while they get it from us, but not
later."
I now came to the subject which interested m.e most.
"Have you received land from the new government?"
Yes. All of them had received land. They hoped now
they would live better. But they had to eat untjl the new
II
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· crop came in and they had no money. Moreover, they would
need money for tools, animals, and seed.
"We have land now, but it is too little for a decent living," one man volunteered. Applause greeted this statement.
~
"How is it," I probed, "that Azafia, who is a bourgeois,
has given you land?"
"The Socialists forced him!"
"We made him do it!"
"He had to!"
These exclamatIons expressed the sense of the meeting.
"And won't you all now become little capitalists?"
This provoked much mirth.
"Maybe we will some day live like human beings instead
'o f animals."
"What about the landlords?" I asked. Derisive laughler.
"Let them weep a bit as we have been weeping all our
lives," a mother proposed.
"Suppose the rights came back and took the land
away," I asked.
"They will have to kill us first!"
"They will never be allowed to come back to office."
"They cannot force us to starve any longer!"
These and many other contacts with .YUAntero8 who had
received land warranted a number of conclusions: The
Yunteros were pleased that they had land. They were more
optimistic. They hoped to get additional land and perhaps
loans from the state for equipment and cattle. They believed that the Socialist Party, to which most of them
adherec;I, would help them in doing"so. They were no longer
in a mood for violent or desperate action. Azafia's land
reform, which ·had commenced in the provinces where conditions were most critical, would probably give the peasants
some hope and inaugurate a period of peace and adjustment in the countryside. Come what might, however, the
peasants would not allow themselves -to be driven off the
land as they had been in the past by reactionary governments. They would further support the Popular Front
and resist the politicians of the right.
I sat on a stone step in the central square of Badaj oz
waiting for my companions, who had gone into a cafe for a
drink, and I entered this note in my book. "Azafia is saving himself without saving Spain. His land reform will
temporarily gratify the Yuntero8 but will do little for the
national economy." The land reform promised to raise the
12

standard of living slightly, but something more fundamental was necessary in order to banish misery and industrial
stagnation from Spain. Azafia and the engineers of the
Institute of Agrarian Reform were talking about farming
collectives. In some sections, indeed, the peasants, on their
own initiative and without ever having heard of collectives
in the Soviet Union, had organized cooperative farms. The
Socialists and Communists, however, put little trust in
Azafia's land reform. In April, 1936, Largo Caballero, the
Socialist leader told me that the people who were then
getting land would not be able to sell their crops. In 1934
and 1935 there had been surplus food in the country while
thousands starved. The ultimate solution was collectivization, Caballero declared, but Azalia would not go so far.
Though disgruntled with Azafia's halfway measures, the
Socialists and Communists continued, nevertheless, to bolster up his authority. They were sure he would fail, but
they were patient with him in the face of the specter of
reactionary rule that rose up the moment the idea of unsea ting Azalia was broached. .
The landlords, on the other hand, looked with great disfavor on Azalia's mild land reform. The feudal barons of
Spain were wedded to the ancient Roman conception of
private property rights whi~h brooked not the slightest interference. Utterly devoid of social outlook, and interested
most of. all in protecting their inherited privileges and
wealth against any encroachment, they overflowed with
bitterness toward the Popular Front government and the
peasantry. During my trip through Estremadura and Andalusia in the spring of 1936, I talked to .several big landlords who looked upon the forced renting of land to the
Y wnteros as the beginning of the end, the doom of the
divine right of landowners. The landowners of all Spain
saw in the events in Caceres and Badajoz a portent of what
would soon happen to them. That they could not, for the
moment, resist the government's measures made them hate
the government all the more.
I t was obvious that the possessing classes would not
easily reconcile themselves to a land reform which they
. regarded as the opening wedge for socialism. In the months
of March and April the reactionary rights were undoubtedly thinking of modes of resistance. It is possible, in the
light of subsequent developments, that they were already
doing more than thinking. The February elections had
stunned them. Many of the prominent aristocrats literally
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fled; they went abroad and transferred their money abroad,
but enough fight was left in the rest of them to put the
Republicans on guard. As Caballero said to me on April
3, 1936, "Now the reactionaries can come back into office
only through a coup d'etat." The estate owners had always
found means of compelling their farm hands to vote for the
right parties. In many villages inhabited by perhaps three
landlord families and hundreds of Socialist Yunteros the
balloting had often shown a maj ority for some black conservative candidate. Now, with the land reform, the barons
would lose this possibility of electoral pressure. They thus
not only resented tpe recent economic changes, but also
were afraid that being numerically few they might never
again recapture political power. The electoral victory of
the Popular Front seemed like the handwriting on the wall.
Writing from Barcelona on April 16, 1936, I said:
"Spain obviously must do something about her poverty
and backwardness. The peasants and city workers demand
better conditions. The right reactionaries, when in office,
answered these demands with terror but nothing else, thus
documenting a fact which is becoming clear to an increasing number of Spaniards-that the reactionaries have lost
the right and never had the ability to rule the country.
This is a very favorable development, and if the liberal
Republicans, Socialists, and Communists behave wisely, the
electoral .vi·c tory which they won exactly two months ago
will keep their enemies out of power for a long, long time,
perhaps forever. The right reactionaries are the large
landed proprietors, the church, the monarchists, and the
few big industrialists. They are depressed, frightened, and
disorganized. Their chief hope at the moment is a violent
coup d'etat with the aid of the army and the Civil Guard."
4.

THE FORCES BEHIND FRANCO:

LANDLORDS, INDUSTRIALISTS, ARMY, AND CHURCH

The possibility of a right uprising was on everybody's
lips during the spring of 1936. In fact, several false alarms
were sounded ~hile I was in Madrid during the first fortnight of April, tanks and armed guards patrolled the
streets, and the Socialists and Communists mobilized their
poorly equipped militia to take pqsts on housetops. The
long-awaited army coup in behalf of landlordism and retrogression took place on July 17, 1936. The government
might have anticipated this move but did not.
Four forces stood behind the revolt-the army, the land14

lords, the big industrialists, and the church. These received
support from Italian and German fascism. One power
stood against it-the Spanish people.
According to the most authoritative study. published in
Madrid in 1932 and quoted with approval in the Foreign
Policy Association's report on Spain dated January 15,
1937, the number of Spanish landlords who owned 250 hectares or more did not exceed fifteen or twenty thousand.
With their families, therefore, the landowning class of
Spain totaled something like 75,000 persons. Their indolence, combined with fear of a rising of the peasant masses,
had undermined their trust in the Spanish earth. They
allowed wheat lands to be put to grazing, and when the
Republican Institute of Agrarian Reform urged them to
reverse this process, the usual complaint was that the government threatened to ruin their flocks. The landlords
took out of the land the maximum and gave back the minimum. The average annual production of wheat per hectare
was 806 kilograms compared with four times that yield in many European countries. For years there was almost no
investment in Spanish agriculture. Estates were misn1anaged by overseers who acted at the same time as village
political bosses and. delivered the votes on election day.
Idle, fashionable scions of landlords preferred the cafes of
Madrid and Paris to the dry fields of Estremadura. The
landowning class was losing its vigor and not reproducing
its wealth, yet even where farms were only partially cultivated the estate owners held tenaciously to their property
rights and objected to the rental of land .to landless peasants. This small decadent class, more than any other, held
Spain in its clutches.
The industrialists, whose plants were for the most part
in the rich cities of Barcelona and Bilbao, were the landlords' allies. As in Russia, industrial progress in Spain had
been a mushroom growth and brought with it strong
working-class organization. But the manufacturers hated
this child which entertained ambitions of b€ing their gravedigger. And their hate made them a.pprehensive and reactionary.
The Spanish army, another powerful element of reaction, was not a class but a caste rooted in the rural and
urban owning classes. The army was in many respects autonomous, and according to Gil Robles, the leader of the
Catholic Popular Action Party, writing in the June 5,
1937, issue of America, it will be autonomous if and when
15

Franco wins. "Initiator of the national Spanish movement
and hope of its future," Gil Robles declares, "is the army,
which is really independent of any of the political parties
that support it." The character of the Spanish army is
strikingly revealed by its composition. In 1931 when the
republic was established there were 21,000 officers in the
army, or about as many as in the German army just before
the World War; 21,000 officers to 130,000 men. There was
one general for every 150 soldiers. The army consumed
30 per cent of the national budget, and for every $3 spent
on equipment and pay for the ranks, $10 went as officers'
salaries. Perhaps the military caste did not wish to make
soldiers of the peasants and working men who would normally be the conscripts. Perhaps it was convinced that
Spain was not threatened by invasion and could always
with benefit remain neutral in a maj or European conflict.
Yet the army, what with the Foreign Legion and the Moroccan auxiliaries, made the officers strong enough to wield
enormous influence in the monarchy as well as in the republic. Army tribunals before 1931 tried civilians as well as
soldiers. The status of officer was sacrosanct. Alfonso XliI
lavished on the armed forces huge s~ms which too frequently went into the pockets of generals and army contractors. John Hay's observation in 1~70 that "the Spanish army from general to corporal is penetrated with conspiracy" was equally true six decades later. The army was
corrupt, inefficient, and loyal only to that government
which did not offend the interests of the classes from which
its officers sprang.
The republic knew this, but it was generous to the point
of folly. It offered to reti~e into the reserve at full pay all
officers who were in disagreement with republican principles.'
Eight thousand officers availed themselves of this opportunity to live in complete leisure and whisper and conspire
in cafes against the new government. Even Azafia's Popular Front Cabinet' tolerated the evils of the army and of
the Civil Guard, a special police force numbering from
30,000 to 40,000 men. Shortly beJore the July revolt the
government belatedly roused itself to feeble action. It
shifted General Francisco Franco, who had been appointed
chief of staff by Gil Robles, to the Canary Islands, and .
General Goded to the Balearics. Here · they were better
able to plot the overthrow of the government. By transferring them Madrid warned them that something worse
might be in store for disloyal officers. They took the warn16

ing and planned the revolt. They had ~aken an oath of
loyalty to the Spanish government and the Spanish constitution. Now they attempted forcibly to overthrow that
government, only recently elected by popular vote. Nevertheless, many foreigners who loudly denounce alleged believers in the overthrow of governments by violence, have
sympathized with and aided the Spanish rebels. This inconsistency would be worthy of more comment if there were
not so much hypocrisy in politics already. The protagonists
of "law and order" object to violent attacks on regimes
which serve their purposes; but they applaud the Spanish military insurrection against a regime which they dislike.
From the very beginning of the army's insurrection, the
Catholic church of Spain has been at the service of the
rebels. Some priests in Loyalist territory staunchly support the legal government, and in the Basque country the
Catholics have taken sides against Franco. But on the
whole the Catholic hi~rarchy has been the partisan of those
who rose up to overthrow by violence a legally constituted
government.
In the light of the history of the Catholic church in
Spain, any other stand would have been startling. Under
the monarchy the church was an established institution, a
branch of the government, and every priest from the archbishop down to the lowliest father in a distant village was
on the state's pay roll. Education was largely in the hands
of the church. Yet in some provinces as many as 60 to 70
per cent o~ the population were illiterate, and Spain was
one of the most backward countries in Europe in respect to
public enlightenment. Nor did great culture exist in the
huge monasteries and academies. The church had grown
fat and decadent. Lawrence A. Fernsworth, a Roman
Catholic and correspondent of the London Times, writing
about Spain in Foreign Affairs for October, 1936, stated
that "the church was the ally of the state; but the state
was regarded by the people as their oppressor. At least,
illiterate and hungering masses saw it that way. Moreover, the church constituted a heavy drain upon the economic resources of the country. It was top-heavy with
clergy-sixteen to twenty of them could be seen any day
at some modest funeral, each one collecting his fee."
The Catholic church of Spain was one of the largest
landowners and business concerns of the country. It operated hotels and factories, owned department stores, numerous electric power plants, newspapers, etc., and represented
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a vast accumulation of capital. Its position within the state
and its activity in the commercial world fixed its political
sympathies. These, in turn, determined the attitude of the
people to it. The church was regarded as just another
feature of the ruling system.
"In the time of the constitutional monarchy, and as a
relic from the ancient connections between the crown and
the church," Jose Maria de 'Semprun Gurrea, a member
ef the Conservative Party and lecturer in the Philosophy
Qf Law at the University of Madrid, wrote in the French
Catholic review Esprit for November, 1936, "the king and,
in his name, the government had the right of appointment
to bishoprics. This right gave rise to unedifying intrigues,
and the habit, equally unedifying, of classing bishops under partisan titles. Such a bishop was known as the initiate
of the Minister X; another of Y, the president of the
counciL The system of promotion, legal in itself, was far
from bringing about the choice of real spiritual leaders.
Those elected were, with few exceptions, men too immersed
in temporal matters, too closely c01).nected with great personages, the world of the nobility, and the greater bourgeoisie which surrounds the high places of power and sociallife. The bishops spent too little time with the people,
and too much with persons of quality. Their world was
rather 'the world,' and sometimes even 'the world of fashion.' " There was therefore a wide gulf between church and
people. The Catholic hierarchy neglected 'its duties to the
masses. The Anglican Bishop of Gibraltar writing in the
Church Times of February 26, 1937, said: "The Roman
Catholic church in Spain has failed and failed lamentably
to present Christianity faithfully to the nation." In Pueblo
del Rio in 1934 I asked the women what they thought of
the church. They replied: "The church does nothing for
us. The church is for the rich. We are Moors," that is, _
non-believers.
.
When the republic came, it continued for some time to
pay reduced subsidies to the church. But it disestablished
the church and made public education secular. This condition prevails in most Western countries and has been accepted by the Catholics in them, yet it sufficed to align
the Catholic church of Spain unalterably against the
liberal forces of the republic. Openly and secretly the hierarchy fought the republic from the very beginning to the
day of Franco's uprising. In 1936. Prime Minister Azafia
said t~ me apropos of the church iss"\le in Spain: "H~ who
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fights in the front line may get a bullet." The church was
conservative and opposed to the Popular Front. It played
a political role. It was therefore treated as a political antagonist. The Spanish church is only "reaping the whirlwind," said a report adopted by the eighty-ninth annual
session of the New York East Methodist Episcopal Conference on May 13, 1937.
When the generals "" rebelled, the hierarchy naturally
made common cause with them. Since the commencement of
the civil war, bishops have blessed Franco's troops, priests
in frocks have borne arms in the ranks against the Loyalists,
and Franco has used churches as fortresses and arsenals.
These facts are heavily documented and not denied. Here
is a sample by G. L. Steer, famous British correspondent,
in the New York Times of May 19, 1937: "The insurgents
occupied a cemetery and a church. In the church tower at
ten o'clock I saw their machine-guns at a distance of 400
yards." The Loyalists would of course try to destroy that
church.
But even before the civil war the hostility of the people
to the church was great. I myself regret the burnings of
churches and monasteries in Sp·ain. But subjective reactions are of little imporlance. The fact that Spaniards
spontaneously sacked religious institutions and killed
priests-the numbers have been exaggerated by the sensational press-is a revealing social phenomenon, and it can
only mean that the church had no hold on their minds,
that the people considered an attack on clericalism as part
of their defense against fascism. This was inevitable when
the clergy had given the impression of complete identification with reaction.
Catholic hierarchies abroad and the Vatican have definitely approved of Franco's rebellion against constituted
authority. On February I, 1937, the Osservatore Romawo,
official organ of the Vatican, wrote, "We do not know when
Franco will take Madrid. We can only hope that it will
be soon." Catholics everywhere have attempted to stir up
sentiment against the Loyalists. The same thing happened
in Spain. When Cardinal Hayes of New York says that a
triumph of the "radical elements" in Spain would be "a
menace to the entire civilization" (New York Post of
March II, 1937) he merely rellects the much more violent
attitude of his Spanish confreres.
This stand by the Catholic church will harm Catholicism
in Spain no matter who wins the civil war. The Catholic
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hierarchy of Spain is fighting Franco's battles to its own
hurt. Franco will go down in history as the man who
bombed and bombarded civilians in Madrid and in the
Basque Catholic country, who imported the hated Moors
and foreign armies into Spain. He will be known as the
general who started a revolt which laid waste vast territories and resulted in the killing of hundreds of thousands
of men, women, and children. Spain will not forgive him
even if he wins. Nor will Spain forgive his clerical abettors.
Franco's hands are red with blood. The Catholic hierarchy upholds those hands. The Catholic church in Spain
will be the loser whatever happens. Putting it mildly, the
London Catholic Herald said on August 21, 1936: "The
church, it is certain, will gain nothing if it creeps back to
power under Franco's bayonets. Only a thorough spiritual
cleansing and revival can save Catholicism in Spain." Some
will doubt whether a clergy that wished to lead its followers
into the camp of a Franco is capable of such a spiritual
e:ffort. Protestantism, which had some followers in Spain
and which Franco is persecuting, may reap some of the
benefits of the situation when peace is restored. But in
general religion will suffer. The help which Catholic priests
have given the rebel Franco has shocked many true
Catholics.
Throughout Europe the Vatican has found in fascism
a rival and hostile philosophy. It fights fascism in Germany. But in Spain it helps fascism, and in Spain it walks
arm in arm with anti-Catholic Nazi troops. This inconsistency will plague it in the future.
The alliance of church, army, industrialists, and landlords represented a minority. There could be nothing in
common between Franco and the millions of undernourished
peasants, or between Juan March, Franco's industrialist
backer, and the radical workers of Bilbao and Barcelona.
The overwhelming mass of Spain's 28,000,000 inhabitants
had very little for which they would owe any gratitude to
the feudal barons, manufacturers, staff generals, and
bishops.
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II. THE CIVIL WAR

1.

THE PEOPLE TAKE THEIR STAND

The Franco revolt, therefore, was immediately rejected
by the bulk of the Spanish nation. In the important cities
of Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia, Bilbao, and Alicante, and
in hundreds of large and small villages, the citizenry, armed
literally with little more than staves and stones, overpowered the garrisons and declared against General
Franco. This phenomenon, which occurred in what is now
Loyalist territory as well as in Franco territory, is · eloquently attested by an important rebel publication entitled
"The Communist Atrocities," issued in London "by authority of the Committee of Investigation appointed by the
government at Burgos." In Almendralejo, it states, in the
province of Badajoz, "the arrests [of "anti-reds"] took
place from July 18 to August 6, the eve of the entrance of
the troops into the citY"-which means that the Loyalist
civilian government continued in control until Franco
brought in his lVloors from Africa. Antequera, in the province of lVlalaga, "experienced the reign of red terror which
lasted from July 18 until August "12." Likewise Azuaga,
in the province of Badajoz, which "from the first day of
the military rising, July 18 till December 24 . . . was in
the hands of the Communist element." And Burguillos del
Cerro, in the province of Badaj OZ, "was in the hands of
the reds from July 15 till September 14, on which date the
Nationalist army obtained possession of it."
Further, "the reign of Communists in Espej'o , in the
province of Cordoba, dates from July 22 ... till September
25, the day on which our victorious troops occupied the
town." "During a period of two months the inhabitants of
Ronda, in the province of Malaga, were under the control
of Communists." El Saucejo, a town of 6,588 inhabitants
in the province of Seville, "was taken by the Nationalist
forces on September 4." Until then the Loyalists ruled this
place which is in the heart of Franco land. These instances
could be multiplied endlessly. On the basis of Franco's own
evidence it is clear that the Spaniards did not want Franco.
There was not a single case where the civil population rose
up and took over the power in the name 'Of the insurgents.
It should be noted that "Nationalist" as it is used in this
rebel publication always means the army of l\1oors and
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Foreign Legionnaires, while "Communist" is a synonym
for the Popular Front, which consists of many parties, including some strongly anti-Communist. Thus on page 155
there is a reference to the "Communist militia of the
C. N'. T." The C. N. T. is an Anarcho-Syndicalist organization. So that this phrase is like 'saying, the A. F. of L.,
headquarters of the C. I. O.
During the first phase of the insurrection, in the latter .
half of July and early in August, Franco had actually
lost the civil war. The people took sides against him and
successfully opposed his mutinous Spanish soldiers. But
the rebels were in a position quickly to transport non.:..
Spanish troops into Spain and this, with the help of German and Italian airplanes which were available to Franco
three days after the uprising, soon turned the tide against
the Loyalists.
The Loyalist army consisted of local militias which
joined the armed forces because they wanted to fight for a
new Spain and against fascism, but not because they had
any military qualities. ' Since the ~ apoleonic wars Spain
had not participated in a foreign war. Its people were not
trained and had no military psychology. The annual conscript class was small. Almost all the officers and an estimated 90 per cent of the rank and file of the regular army
went over ,to Franco when he broke his oath. The militias
had enthusiasm and devotion to the cause, but no exp€rience and few weapons.
'
Even when the civil war was six months old, not every
Loyalist soldier had his individual rifle. The scarcity of
rifles in the early months brought many a disaster. Mexico
sent 20,000 muskets in a moment of dire need but they did
not suffice. I often saw arms at the front marked "Oviedo
1896." Machine-guns were rare; so was artillery. In the
beginning the government had no airplanes at all. Subsequently Andre Malraux, the famous French novelist, organized a foreign flying squadron which did valiant service. Before long, however, it ceased to be a match for the
large numbers of bombing and pursuit planes which were
flown in from Germany and Italy.
Under these circumstances Franco's army encountered
little resistance in pushing up quicKly from Badajoz to
Merida, to Caceres, to ,'Talavera de la Reina, to Toledo,
and to the environs of Madrid. On November 6, the rebels
stood at the gates of the capital.
Meanwhile the ' insurgents had organized a government
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a t Burgos. In official decrees dated August 3, September
26, and September 28, Azafia's agrarian reforms of the
early part of the year were canceled, and all -land which
had been distributed among landless peasants was returned
to the estate holders. Public instruction, an edict declared,
would no longer be secular. Religious education, on the
other hand, became compulsory in all schools. At the same
time the monarchist flag replaced the banner of the republic. Franco thus stood revealed once more. He was looking
backward. The people of Spain were well a.c quainted with
the Francos. Franco had no need of promising the Spaniards anything because they knew from his past what he
would be in the future. The majority of the nation had rejected Franco and the reactionaries of his type on February 16, 1936. They rejected him in July when they overcame his mutinous troops in Barcelona, Madrid, and other
places. They were rejecting him every day in every way.
Indeed, every day in Spain wa-s election day. There are
many ways of voting, and the dropping of a ballot into an
urn is the easiest and not always the most convincing. Lenin
, once said that in 1917 "the Czarist army voted for peace
with its legs. It ran away from the trenches." Often as I
rode through the Spanish provinces during the civil war,
peasants tilling their fields would drop their plows when
they saw the car, lift a clenched fist, and shout "Salud!"
~hose peasants did not know me. I dashed past them in a
second. But ,they felt an inner urge ' to vote that morning,
or afternoon, for Spanish democracy. In the months of
September and October, as Franco pressed steadily on
toward Madrid, I daily watched whole villages evacuate
in front of his advancing hosts. Each time he approached
a settlement, the bulk of its inhabitants packed their meager
worldly goods on mule- or dog-drawn carts, placed the old
grandmothers or young children on top, and drew off in
the direction of Madrid. They did not know where they ,
were going. They slept by the roadsides. They had neither
money nor food. They did not know what the morrow
would bring. They knew only one thing: they did not want
to live with Franco. Their evacuation was a vote of nonconfidence in the rebels. It was a vote for the Loyalists.
The defense of Madrid is likewise a plebiscite. General
Mola had boasted that he would drink coffee in a Madrid
cafe on October 12, the "Day of the Race," the day on
which Columbus discovered America. Franco declared, in
the finest Spanish tradition of announcing military move23

ments in advance, that he would take Madrid on November
7, just to celebrate the Bolshevik Revolution. Then it was
officially stated by the rebels that the Moors would enter
the Catholic capital on Christmas Day. Yet Madrid still
resists.

2.

THE MIRACLE OF MADRID

The miracle of Madrid is intelligible only through the
attitude of the civilian population. Any evening during the
siege, after the noises of traffic had been hushed, I could
open my hotel window and hear distinctly the rat-a-tat-tat
of machine-guns and the individual cracks of rifles. One
night, coming home from the front, it was brought home
to me very graphically how close to Madrid the enemy was
-the street cars, their windows painted blue to keep in
their lights, had stopped after curfew hours and stood still
on their tracks in the central streets and squares of Madrid,
for the trolley car barns were in the hands of Franco.
From most places in Madrid a twenty-minute walk brings
one to the trenches. The fate of Madrid, therefore, rests
in the hands of its women. I have seen these women, dressed
for the most part in black, forming queues early in the
morning to receive their meager rations of peas, rice, vegetable oil, and bread. They often stood five abreast in a line
thre~ hundred yards long. Not far away, their husbands,
or brothers, or sons were fighting under rebel fire. Their relatives might have been killed or wounded yesterday. They
had left the older children at home.. They might return to
fip.d their bodies mangled and crushed under houses
bombed by German and Italian airplanes. Fuel was as
scarce as food, and the water supply was turned off for
at least ten hours during every twenty-four. The women
waited patiently for hours, frequently holding babies in their arms. Hostile bombers have dropped bombs on such
queues, bombs which are steel cylinders containing 100,
or 200, or 500 pounds of explosives. Arriving at such a
scene several minutes after bombing, one sees limbs~ scattered, brains and intestines spattered against walls, and
remnants of human bodies strewn in all directions. The
wear and tear on the nerves and physical condition of the
living is terrific. Those women of Madrid are the martyrs
and the heroin'es. If ten thousand women of the capital rose
up in protest and walked into the arms of Franco~ the
siege of Madrid would be ended and Franco would be
master of Sp~in's capital. But the women, as well as the
24

men, vote "no" on Franco. That is a plebiscite sealed with
blood, a democracy paid for with a heavy toll of humanlives. Instead of depression, fervor and faith in victory
rule Madrid. As soldiers march through the streets on their
way to the front, these black-dressed women of the queues
give them the clenched-fist signal, and cry "No Pasaran!"
-they shall not pass. The military are executing an order
of the civilian population when they hold the city against
the rebels., "Madrid must become the tomb of fascism,"
read the placards posted throughout Madrid when
Franco's troops neared the city. The spirit within -the city
stiffened the backbone of the Loyalist soldiers who fought
in its outskirts. The men could not be less courageous
than the women.
3.

FOREIGN PARTICIPATION

Other factor-s strengthened the Loyalist army. During _
most of October the government forces were practically
without the support of airplanes. Day after day Franco's
procedure was as follows: His Junkers and Capronis would
bomb a village or Loyalist position. Then the Moors would
rush -in and occupy it. Franco also enj oyed a tremendous
superiority of artillery, machine-guns, and rifles. In October small Italian whippet tanks made their appearance.
For months the Non-Intervention Committee had been
holding sessions in London. Germany, Italy, -a nd Portugal
were partners to its agreement not to ship munitions into
Spain. But the committee had become a laughing-stock.
The whole world knew that Hitler and Mussolini were honoring the agreement in the breach. The agreement meant
that while France, England, and other truly neutral countries refused to supply arms to the legally constituted government of Spain, which by all principles of international
law was entitled to such aid, the fascist states uninterruptedly furnished the insurgents with weapons of war. Whatever its intention, the effect of the non-intervention pact
was profoundly disadvantageous to the Loyalists.
- On October 7, accordingly, the Soviet government's representative in the London Non-Intervention Committee
told that body that "his government feared the situation
created by repeated violations of the agreement would
render the agr_eement virtually non-existent, and th~t they
could in no case agree to turn the agreement into a screen
shielding the military aid given to the rebels by some of
the partic~pants in the committee." The Soviet govern25

ment, therefore, declared that if the violations of the agreement were not immediately stopped, Moscow would consider itself free from the obligations arising out of the agreement. The news of this statement released explosions of
joy in Spain and Russia. The U. S. S. R. was hailed as
Spain's great friend, and the newspapers were full of radiant editorials and optimistic comment. On October 16,
Joseph Stalin wrote: "The toiling classes of the U. s. S. R.
merely carry out their duty when they give all possible aid
·to the revolutionary masses of Spain. They realize that
the liberation of Spain from the yoke of fascist reactionaries is not the private affair of Spaniards but the general
concern of all advanced and progressive mankind." The
concrete effects of these announcements began to appear
during the third week of October in the fonn of airplanes
and large, fast tanks. Franco's domination of the air was ,
no longer unquestioned. The sense of inferiority and helplessness engendered in a soldier when he sees his regiment
bombed time and again while his own side has no planes
was replaced by a feeling of pride and rejoicing. The morale of the Spanish army began to rise steeply.
Help also came from foreign intellectuals and workingTIlen. But the Loyalists felt the lack of shock troops consisting of experienced fighters. Accordingly, several months
after Franco rebelled, the Communist organiza tions in
France and other countries organized an International
Brigade in which World War veterans and men trained
as conscripts in the armies of Europe enrolled for active
service in Spain. There were many Communists, many
Italian Socialists, Belgian Socialists, and non-party antifasci~ts. ,;£,hey had all opposed fascism by attending meetings, marching in street demonstrations,. distributing literature, etc., in their native countries. Now they were transferring the scene of their activities to the Madrid
trenches, where the battle against international fascism
was hottest. They were fighting for Spain, but at the same
time they were directtng their shots against the f ascisms
at home, for it was generally realized that a Franco victory
would be a victory for Hitler and Mussolini and therefore
for fascism generally. Spain had become the key to
Europe's future political and social development. The men
of the International Brigade came in legal and illegal
fashion. Some of them walked hundreds of miles, stole
across frontiers, and arrived at recruiting headquarters
footsore a.nd penniless. They hailed from farm and bakery
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and steel mill. They hailed also from universities, sheltered
homes, and iv'ory towers. With hardened proletarians
came men like Ludwig Renn, ex-German nobleman and
aristocra t, Nazi prisoner and outstanding novelist; Lukach, Hungarian author, a W orld War veteran, who was
given the rank of general; Ralph Fox, British Communist
novelist and author of a life of Lenin; several British~
poets; the son of a British rear admiral, and others. They
were all volunteers, the Lafayettes of the modern industrial
age. Just as Madrid was about to fall into Franco's lap,
the International Brigade's first unit, 1,900 strong"
marched into the fray. For the first time the Moors were
stopped. For the first time the militiamen sa'v the heels
and backs of Franco's soldiers. The Spaniards learned that
it could be done. The International Brigade became a
practical school for Spanish units. The militiamen grew
to love their foreign comrades, and fought best when some
of their companies and battalions were amalgamated with
sections of the International Brigade. The international
Popular Front against fascisnl had become a reality. The
International Brigade served not nlerely by its own fighting but by raising the fighting capacity of thousands of
Spaniards.
The size of the International Brigade has been wildly
exaggerated, partly as an implied tribute to its military
achievements, and partly, too, in an attempt to justify the
sending of large units of German and Italian infantry.
But in the middle of January, 1937, the International
Brigade's total strength was no more than 13,000, and
at no time has its effective strength exceeded 20,000. Yet
it has written a glorious page in the history of the Spanish civil war.
On November 6 the ~Iadrid government fled from the
capital to Valencia. The Junta, or Committee of Defense,
which assumed charge, was burdened with the double task
of checking Franco and supplying a hungry, cold, bombtorn city, swollen by the advent of several hundred thousand refugees. It acquitted itself so well that many in
its entourage began to have ambitions for it and conceived
of the Junta as the provisional revolutionary government
of Spain. Gradually, however, prestige and authority returned to the Caballero Cabinet. It alone could send tlte
reinforcements, munitions, food, and money without which
Madrid would be lost, and it steadily established its control over ·the rest of Loyalist Spain.
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Before the siege of Madrid had lasted a month, it became apparent that Franco could not take the city with
the limited forces at his command. He had vast storehouses
of guns and other equipment, but too few men. The Moors
and Foreign Legion were being decimated in stubborn attacks on the city, and reinforcements' could not be obtained. Most Spaniards refused to 'fight for him, and those
who were pressed into the rebel ranks proved to be unreliable material. At this stage-about the middle of December, 1936-Franco had lost the war a second time. ' He
could make no progress, and to stand still was disastrous.
There was only one solution: he ~appealed to Italy and
Germany for soldiers. Practically all Franco's pilots and
tank drivers were German or Italian. Many of his gunners
were likewise Italian or German. But the fascist powers
had sent no compact fighting units to Spain. Franco now
asked for them, and Hitler and Mussolini complied. The
figures are necessarily in dispute. Nevertheless, it is a safe
estimate that Germany shipped no fewer than 10,000 and
perhaps as many as 20,000 trained soldiers to the Franco
lines, while Mussolini was more generous with at least
50,000 and perhaps 80,000 or 90,000. Portugal did its bit,
too.
The Soviet Union has sent no soldiers to the Loyalists.
There are at most a dozen Soviet citizens in the International Brigade and several hundred former white or
counter-revolutionary Russians from France, who by joining sought to document their new political attitude. They
are endeaVOTIng to return to lVioscow via Madrid. In other
respects, however, the military assistance given the Loyalists by the D. s. S. R. was similar to that given to Franco
by Gennany and Italy. Both sides received airplanes (plus
pilots), tanks, cannons, and machine-guns from their foreign friends.
Yet fascist intervention in Spain differs completely from
the Soviets' help to the Popular Front. The Valencia government has stated publicly that it possesses evidence of
conversations which took place in Rome in 1934 between
Mussolini and Spanish reactionary politicians wherein the
Duce undertook to assist in the forcible overthrow of the
Spanish republic and its replacement by a mona.r chy. Data
is available to support a hypothesis that Germany and
Italy were informed in advance about Franco's proposed
coup against the Madrid government. General Sanjurjo,
initiator of an abortive anny rising in August, 1932, who
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was to have been the leader of the 1937 revolt but whose
airpl.a ne crashed when he attempted to fly from Lisbon to
rebel territory on the second day of the insurrection, was
in Berlin shortly before July 17, and Franco himself was
in touch with German representatives. The presumption of
preliminary knowledge and aid is a strong one, but the
final demonstration waits upon the publication 'of further
aocuments. It is known, however, that three days before
the revolt started, Italy ordered six military airplanes to
Franco in Spanish Morocco. Three of these crashed in
French Morocco, and Governor General Victor Denain reported to Paris on the nature of the craft, stating that
their pilots had received their orders on July 15 (M anchester Guardian,. March 16, 1937). Germap. and Italian airplanes were carrying Moorish soldiers from Morocco to
'Spain in the second fortnight of July. The situation, accordingly, amounted to this: a disloyal general had no
sooner risen against his government than two foreign
powers were ready to give him the wherewithal of victory.
From the point of view of established bourgeois governments this would appear to be a most dangerous precedent.
In similar circumstances the German Henlein party in
Czecho-Slovakia might seize a few villages or towns in
provinces coterminous with Germany and then invite the
Reichswehr to come to its assistance. The result might
quickly become a European war. When, in addition to
military equipment, Germany and Italy placed whole regiments of trained soldiers on Spanish soil, the world was
face to face with a full-fledged invasion of a foreign state
which had been guilty of no crime or even mild offense
against either of the invading governments. Treaties have
long ago ceased to be serious considerations in intern a- .
tional affairs. But ·for open and cynical flouting of laws,
rules, and pacts, recent events in Spain have no equal in
all post-war anarchy.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, scrupulously adhered to the non-intervention agreement which it, in common with a score of other powers, including Germany,
Italy, and Portugal, had signed. (Soviet trade unions,
however, contributed f09d and clothing worth many millions of gold rubles to their fellow-workers in Spain during the early months of the civil war.) It was only in October, after the non-intervention compact had become a
generally recognized farce, that the Soviets commenced to
aid the Spanish government with war material which it
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was entitled under intern a tional law to purchase unhampered and at all times.
Soviet assistance to the Loyalists differed also in its motives from that which fascist states accorded Franco. It
has been said that Franco promised Germany and Italy
monopoly concessions in the Bilbao iron mines, the Almaden mercury fields near Ciudad Real, the Rio Tinto copper
mines, and other mineral deposits of Spain. It would be
natural if the rebels, having won, would out of gratitude
and to annul their indebtedness for munitions shipped,
grant Germany and Italy special privileges in exploiting
the wealth of their country. As the London Economist of .
May 15, 1937, put it: "A government placed (and probably maintained) in power by German and Italian bayonets
and bombers would be in no position effectively to resist
foreign encroachment on Spain's natural resources." Reports have also appeared regarding the promise of spheres
of influence or even colonies to Germany and Italy. Thus
the Balearic Islands are said to have been made over to
Italy, and it is an established fact that Italian troops and
agents have made themselves very much at home on the
island of Majorca. As part of this scheme, the Germans
were to receive the Canary Islands or coaling and naval
stations on them, as well as a preferred position in Spanish
Morocco, in which Germany had manifested keen interest
during the Kaiser's time.
But the stakes in Spain are even higher than these important considerations. Spain has an invaluable geographic
position, especially for Italy. A foothold in Spain or the
friendship of a vassal Spanish government might be decisive in a future war. Italy,. thanks to the conquest of Ethiopia, has become the active, and the even greater potential,
rival of the far-flung British Empire, and the intrenchment of Rome in Spain would extend Italian control of the
western Mediterranean. For similar reasons Germany would
be pleased to dig in in Spain and l\lorocco.
Italy and Germany, bent on expansion, are maneuvering
in Spain for new strategic positions. The Spanish civil
war has in this sense ceased to be merely a struggle between
two domestic factions and has taken on many of the aspects of an international conflict. The first battle of the
second World War is now being fought in Spain. A victory for Franco would bea victory for Hitler and Mussolini. Fascist intervention in Spain is not an isolated phenomenon. It is part of a chain of events which began when
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the Japanese marched into Manchuria in September, 1931.
The ease with which Tokyo accomplished this violation of
foreign territory and the ineffectiveness of the protests of
foreign powers and the League of Nations undoubtedly
facilitated Mussolini's decision to attack Ethiopia in October, 1935. Similarly, Mussolini's triumph in East Africa
notwithstanding efforts by the League of Nations and
Great Britain to block him showed Hitler that he had
nothing to fear if he scrapped international treaties and
militarized the Rhineland. He did so on March 7, 1936.
This momentous occasion passed off so smoothly that both
Hitler and Mussolini were convinced they could now defy
the rest of the world, especially if they acted together.
This is the pre-history of their intervention in Spain, and
the fact that in Spain, too, they met with little resistance
from England and France gave them an even greater contempt -for the vacillating democracies. A fascist triumph in
Spain would thus prove that in Europe today he who dares,
wins. Depending, of course, on the internal strength of
Germany and Italy, these countries could then launch other
adventures in which the benefits obtained by them in Spain
would grant them an additional initial advantage. The
democratic powers would be in danger.
In Great Britain and France these truths are understood by many persons. Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, the
_well-known British military authority, for instance, has expressed concern for the "life-line of the Empire" in the
event of a fascist victory in Spain. "The danger is so obvious," Captain Hart stated (see Manchester Guardian,
of April 15, 1937), "that it is hard to understand the
eagerness with which · some of the most vocally patriotic
sections of the British public desire the rebels' success. A
military-minded Spain allied with the fascist powers might
make Gibraltar untenable and even threaten our route
round the Cape by an air base in the Canaries. The danger
would be even worse if a hostile air and submarine base
was established in the Balearics." But those who determine
British policy were torn -between their desire to shield the
British Empire by thwarting German and Italian designs
in Spain, and their distrust of the Loyalists, whom they
regard as Communists or a preparation for communism.
This economic or class prejudice p·a ralyzed the natural
British inclinations to prevent the enemies of the; Empire
from pressing their schemes against it. Likewise in France
the possibility that Germany and Italy would create an31

other front south of the Pyrenees, which might be disastrous to France in case of a German attack on Alsace, and
the fact that an Italian force in the Balearics could stop
France from bringing over her colonial troops from North
Africa, should have created overwhelming sympathy among
the bourgeoisie for Loyalist Spain. This, coupled with the
very vigorous championship of the legal Spanish government on the part of the French trade unions, might have
found more concrete expression than the non-intervention
agreement. But here, too, economic prej udices against the
Loyalists frustrated national desires. The result was that
both France and England became split personalities in
rela tion to the Spanish civil war. Divided allegiance was
especially obvious in England, where sympathies often
swayed with the fortunes of war. In the beginning, when
Franco seemed to be the sure victor, British sentiment
leaned toward him. Later, the gallant defense of Madrid
swung British sympathies to the other side. Because of the
balance between what the rulers of England ought to do ,to
safeguard their Empire, and what they think is their duty
toward the maintenance of capitalism, there is always this
uncertainty in her attitude. If England and France were
clearly anti-fascist at home, they would experience no difficulty in carrying out a firm anti-fascist foreign policy. But
they are not clearly anti-fascist, and they therefore lack
the firmness which might have benefited the Loyalist cause.
In· fact, their attitudes have had the effect of helping
Franco's cause.
The Soviet Union, however, had no such problem. By its
philosophy and social structure anti-fascist, it passed
through no inne; struggle before deciding where its sympathies in Spain lay., There were questions of expediency
and technical obstacles. Delicate diplomatic formalities had
to be observed in order that the benefit which the Loyalists
received from Soviet assistance might not be· canceled by
the hostility it provoked in England and France. The Bolsheviks were first of all concerned lest a Hitler and Mussolini victory in Spain hasten the second World War. Moscow
detests war. It has nothing to gain from war. It could obviously entertain no territorial ambitions in Spain. Russia's pro-Loyalist activity in Spain partakes of the nature
of war prevention. In the present state of world armaments
and international tengion, there is no use talking peace or
yearning for peace~ The only way to achieve peace is to
stop the fascist aggressors who have made wars and who
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are the most likely initiators -of more wars. Fascist regimes
require frequent foreign triumphs to sugarcoat the pill of
domestic hardshi1Js. Peace, or the inability to start and
successfully conclude a military adventure, consequently
becomes an embarrassment to the fascist powers and an
element in their weakness. By preventing war Russia weakens fascism. By weakening fascism Russia helps the democracies who lack the unity of purpose to help themselves.
This is therefore a service to the British and French empires, which, sa ted now, want the status 'quo and no war.
But it is above all a service to the new Spain that is to rise
on Franco's grave. Soviet efforts on behalf of the Loyalists, accordingly, stimulat"e rev'Olution in one country,
stabilize the capitalist democracies in other countries, and
contribute to the downfall of totalitarian systems in still a
third group of nations. Anyone who seeks to simplify this
situation is departing from the complicated reality of modern times. Moscow may not be interested in safeguarding
British imperialism against its fascist rivals. But this
would be the inevitable by-product of the establishment of
a liberal or social-democratic, or even soviet state in Spain.
The only way of attacking British imperialism' via Spain
is to let Franco win.
It is strangely paradoxical but true that the same set
of Soviet actio;ns staves off an invasion of the U. S. S. R.,
strengthens the French . and British bourgeoisies, undermines the Spanish bourgeoisie, and upsets the scheme of
Italian and German fascism. The naive and malicious contend that .each of these results is deliberate and welcome. The discerning realize that no one result is obtainable
without all the rest. Paris may be using the Bolsheviks,
but the Bolsheviks get their benefits from Paris, too. If
there were no such exchange, neither party would be foolish enough to play the game. But since the two sides are
so different, the advantages they derive from their relationship must be of a contradictory character. They reflect
a crude working arrangement between two separate
worlds, the bourgeois democra,cies and the slowly emerging
Soviet democracy, unequally menaced by a common enemy
- fascism.
The prospect of the spread of communism to another
country is as appealing to Russia as the chance of implanting fascism in Spain is to Germany and Italy. Soviet aid
to Spain has undoubtedly strengthened the Communist
Party there and created much pro-Communist sentiment.
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But the Bolsheviks do not believe that a revolution can be
exported. They hold that the need for revolution grows
in national soil. They are convinced that ultimately Spain
will become Communist. But they do not wish to interfere
in internal Spanish affairs because they know how deeply
Spaniards would resent it. They know intervention would
defeat its own ends. In interviews granted to the press,
Franco . has stated that he is a fascist and favors the
Italian type of corporative state. He has formally established himself as fascist dictator. Hitler congratulated him
when he did so. But loyalist Spain has set up no dictatorship. And its leaders insist that it will remain a democratic
state. Moscow openly applauds this intention.
4.

FACTIONS Al\IONG THE LOYALISTS

At present Loyalist Spain is a democracy. On April 15,
1937, in approximately the same week that Franco abolished all parties except the Fascist Party, Premier Largo
Caballero assured a delegation of British women 'members
of Parliament, consisting among others the Duchess of
Atholl, Ellen Wilkinson, Dame Rachel Crowdy, and
Eleanor Rathbone, when ' they asked him whether Spain
would become a soviet state, that it would be a "parliamentary democracy which would utilize the experience
gained by the civil war." He emphasized the fact that his
opinion was based as much upon political as upon moral
considerations. "A feeling of union and solidarity has
arisen among the various political parties who support the
legitimate government," he said, "and this feeling will survive the war, with no political party attempting to impose
its particular platform upon the others." The Duches.s of
Atholl made this comment after the interview with Cab~l
lero: "The war in Spain is a war for freedom. The struggle
of the government's troops is a struggle for the independence of Spain as well as for the security of England and
France."
The exigencies of war obviously limit the freedom of
individuals. But the Popular F 'r ont is in its essence democratic because it consists of parties with varying philosophies and policies; what the Loyalist government does is
the result of a give and take and often of preliminary
negotiations and pourparlers between groups. Some have
regarded the Communists' advocacy of democracy in Spain
as a tactical maneuver to mislead foreign democracies and
bourgeois liberals into supporting the Loyalists. This in34

terpreta tion is wrong; such a trick would soon become teo
transparent for use. The democracy slogan means that the
Communists have no desire to establish in Spain a dictatorship guided by one party as in Russia. Spanish conditions
are different. The Communists do not wish to suppress the
Anarchists or Socialists or left Republicans or any antifascist group. All these parties are united ' in fighting
Franco. The Popular Front combines the most variegated
elements, and it was not without reason that on February
8, 1937, Lord Cranbourne, British Assistant Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, stated in reply to a question in
the House of Commons that "the British government are
sure that the Valencia government was legally constituted
and represented all the Spanish parties except one or two
small groups."
The Popuiar Front extends from the far right to the
far left. It includes on the conservative flank the Basque
Catholics, who, though separated geographically from the
rest of Loyalist Spain, have stubbornly defended their
country and the autonomy which the Cortes accorded
. them on October 1, 1936, against the onslaught of the
lVIoslem Moors, the Italians, and the anti-Catholic Germans
who committed the barbarous crime of Guernica. Moving
from right to left, we come to the left bourgeois Republicans-consisting of Azaiia's party, . lVIartinez Barrio's
party, and the Catalan left-who represent the views of
the intellectuals and the middle class of shopkeepers and
small peasants, and then to the right Socialists-'whose
leader, Indalecio Prieto, is himself a prominent Bilbao
industrialist-the left Socialists, the Communists, and the
Anarchists. The Popular Front, accordingly, is a coalition
of captalist and anti-capitalist groups. This marriage is
not one of convenience. It rather reveals with exciting
clarity the essence of the Spanish struggle. The Basque
Catholics are fighting Franco because he has announced
himself in favor of a strongly centralized government. He
stated in an interview with Roy Howard of the ScrippsHoward papers that he would not tolerate Catalonian
autonomy, and the Basques have al~ays assumed that he
would destroy their free status. And although the Basque
Nationalist Party is essentially bourgeois, yet it, as well
as the left Republicans, are allied with the radical proletariat and peasantry because they realize that Spain's past
rulers were a hopelessly unintelligent lot who had brought
the couN-try to the brink gf economic and political ruin.
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From the domestic point of view the struggle in Spain
is a contest between the forces of darkness, who are ready
to sacrifice the country in order to save their feudal system, and all those who feel that the only hope for a prosperous and happy Spain lies in rebuilding Spain on · a
new basis. Torn between the alternative of a rotten social
structure based on absentee landlordism and a new economy
with many Socialist features, the forward-looking capitalists chose the latter after the recalcitrance of the reactionaries in the first five years of the republic had made a
middle-of-the-road solution impossible. The best bourgeois
minds of Spain support the Loyalists because they love
their country and their liberty. Franco and fascism would
destroy both.
During the two Azafia administrations the Spanish liberal bourgeoisie tried, with as little offense as possible to
the economic royalists, to initiate some changes which
might improve material conditions under capitalism and
start Spain on the road to progress. They were stopped
at every step by the Francos. It was indeed in the midst
of just such a period of mild bourgeois reform that
Franco rose up to smash the republic. The enlightened
bourgeoisie's very existence depended on the success of
Azafia's cautious program. It would have helped the small
farmer, the merchants, and the industrialists. But the landlords in agrarian Spain were protecting only themselvesand doing: that badly. Accordingly, when Franco started
the civil war, the progressive capitalist elements had little
choice. Franco had rej ected them. The Socialists and Communists had not only tolerated but even supported them.
Azafia, Martinez Barrio, the Basque Catholics, and other
propertied groups are sur~ today that a fascist victory
would safeguard Spain for medievalism and poverty,
whereas the triumph of the Loyalists, even though it might
ultimately inconvenience Spanish capitalism, would benefit
Spain. The forward':'looking Spanish bourgeoisie, in other
words, is likewise a split personality. But its nationalism
dominates its class interests, especially since those class interests would not be served by the political intrenchment of
the landlords. The owning classes of Spain are on both sides
of the barricades. For the sake of a happier Spain, one pa~t
of the bourgeoisie has made itself the willing confederate of
the proletariat. In this respect the Spanish civil war is very
different from the Russian civil war.
Largo Caballero, the Socialist leader, became Prime
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Minister on September 4, 1936. This signified that the left
Republicans were becoming less important. Socialistic
trends acquired- gre.a ter momentum. When the civil war
broke out, many landlords and big business 'men in Loyalist
territory fled, or were hurriedly tried and executed as
fascist sympathizers, or were murdered by peasants in retaliation for years of poverty and subjugation. Their
properties were thereupon confiscated. The confiscation, however, was not always orderly or conducted by state
authorities. Often the peasants, united in the Casa del
Pueblo, or People's House, took the land and subdivided
it among themselves, or worked it collectively. In the cities
hotels, department stores, large commercial enterp'rises, factories, and means of transportation were sequestered by
powerful trade unions like the Socialist-controlled U. G. T.
(Union of General Workers) or the Anarcho-Syndicalist
C. N. T. (National Confederation of Workers), or by the
several political parties, or by departments of the government. Through this chaos one tendency, however, was
clear: the immediate result of the outbreak of hostilities
was a blow to capitalism in Spain. Franco made this social
revolution. The expropriated capitalists should file their
complaints with the rebels. But for the insurrection the
Republicans might have plodded along in power for years.
Even a Socialist government might have hesitated to take
very ra'dical measures. But what failed to happen in years
of peace took place in the first three months of war under
the impact of Franco's attack on the legitimate government.
Nevertheless, the numerous small capitalist farmers were
spared, as were petty shopkeepers and similar enterprises.
Formally, the sequestration of capitalist property was a
war measure against political enemies of the Loyalists. Yet
formalities do not count where the social implications are
so obvious. Socialism has made great strides in Loyalist
Spain. ·Capitalism, nevertheless, persists, and it is not the
policy of the government to crush it. Indeed, th~ Communist Party has printed posters urging the protection of
the small proprietor in village and city, and other radical
parties have conducted propaganda to the same end. While
capitalism persists, the left RepubliGans have a part to
play in the political life of Spain. But it is not a leading
part. The participation of the bourgeois parties in the
Loyalist government is also a symbol. To capitalists in
fascist Spain, and to the outside world, it is intended as
an indication that Valencia has no plan now of setting up
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a soviet state or a Communist regime after victory in the
civil war.
What will happen in Spain when hostilities end will depend on circumstances. The attitude of the bourgeois
powers and of the Soviet Union will be a decisive factor.
The extent of the ruination and destruction consequent
upon the civil war will be another consideration. Experiments which might arouse the hostility of certain classes
may not be regarded as conducive to reconstruction. In
Soviet Russia economic distress resulting from intervention
and civil war forced Lenin to introduce the New Economic
Policy, which was a concession to capitalism. There are
no perfect analogies in history; yet what the Bolsheviks
did may serve as a precedent for Spain. The length of the
civil war will determine many a social policy when it is ·over.
The active formula tors of Loyalist policy are, and probably for some time to come will be, -the Socialists, Communists, and Anarcho-Syndicalists. The Socialist Party
counted approximately 75,000 members when the civil war
commenced, but there were 1,200,000 Socialist trade unionists in the U. G. T., which was strong in both city and
village. The Socialists were divided into right and left
wings, the first representing a reformist or gradualist tendency and the latter a more radical one. Yet neither wing
was ever anti-Communist or anti-Moscow as other Socialist
and Labor parties are. Moreover, the experience of the
early years of the . republic converted numerous moderates
to a revolutionary attitude, and the civil war did the rest.
While old and sometimes personal antagonisms may persist between right- and left-wing Socialists, the party is
today more united than ever, and it has been found that
many a former right-winger cooperates more enthusiastically with the government, and what is equally significant,
with the C'o mmunists, than some left-wingers.
The liaison between Socialists and Communists is intimate. In March, 1936, the Communist Party in Spain had
20,000 members. A month later it had 50,000. Today it
numbers several hundred thousand in Loyalist Spain alone.
The record of its fighting units at the front has given it
much prestige. At one time the Fifth Regiment, which was
really an army corps consisting of some-25,000 to 30,000
soldiers, Communists all, and including artillery, armored
tanks, and the like, practically held the front around
Madrid. This and similar circumstances have attracted to
the party many Spaniards whom the civil war brought into
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active public life for the first time. The virility of the COlTImunist Party and the unity within it have also acted as a
lodestone to left-wing Socialists, and a number of these
adhered to the Communist Party in December, 1936. Wh~n
this proved irritating to Socialist leaders, the Communists,
practicing the self-effacement which has characterized
their work ever since hostilities began, discouraged such
persons from entering their ranks. The Communists have
not advertised their strength. They have avoided every
stand that might dis~pt the Popular Front or irritate
their political rivals among the Loyalists. When it developed that party armies interfered. with good military discipline the Communists set the example by disbanding the
Fifth Regiment. They subordinate all else to victory in the
war. The Socialists take the same .view. In Catalonia the
Socialists and Communists have amalgamated into one
party, called the P. S. U. C. The Socialist and Communist
youth organizations of Spain merged .more than a year
ago, and the fusion of all Spanish Socialists and Communists into a unified body finds an increasing number of
protagonists.
The relation between the Communists and Anarchists,
however, has lacked this harmony. In the minds of naive
people, and of some statesmen, anarchism and communism
are identical. But their philosophies, if not their millennial
aims, are poles apart, and their methods are diametrically
opposed. The Communists believe in strict discipline and
action by masses to compel acceptance of their program.
Unless it is forced upon them, they reject violence except
in the ultimate attempt to seize power. Anarchists, on the
other hand, believe in no subordination of the individual to
his group and in sporadic terror. Hating the existing capitalist system TIO less than the Communists, they may destroy prominent persons or physical objects more to give
expression to that hatred than to achieve a practical goal.
The Communists do not condemn government as such; they
merely prefer their own, whereas the Anarchists, seeing the
evils of governments which oppress them, hold that all governments are inherently bad, including one which they might
set up themselves.
The Anarchist movement has a long history in Spain.
For decades the Russian Bakunin was better known and
more widely accepted in Catalonia and Andalusia than was
the German Marx. In the past Spanish Anarchists have
refused to cooperate with Socialists or Communists, whom
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they regard as reactionary. Important strikes were some. times broken by too precipitate or too violent Anarchist
action. Rumors that minor Anarchist leaders could be and
had been bought by manufacturers acquired wide currency.
The hostility between Anarchists and Marxists was considerable.
'l'he Anarchists hailed the founding of the republic but
refused to establish any contact with even its most radical
supporters. True to their principles, they refrained from
participating in elections or sending · delegates to the
Cortes. In 1934 and 1936, however, occasions did arise
when Anarchists threw some voting strength to a Republican parliamentary candidate who was in danger of being
defeated by a reactionary, and when Franco started his
rebellion, the F. A. I. (Federation of the Anarchists of
Iberia) and the C. N. T., the trade-union organization
guided by the F. A. I., immediately joined the Loyalists.
The Spanish Anarchist movement is deeply' revolutionary.
Most of its adherents are workingmen and poor peasants,
and no other alignment was to have been expected. In the'
first days of the revolt Anarchists bravely stormed the
Franco garrisons in Barcelona, and quickly suppressed the
.
mutiny.
The Anarchists became the allies of the Popular Front,
but they were not peaceful bedfellows. It was frequently
stated in Spain during the early months of the civil war
that many fascists and Franco friends who had been unable
to escape from Loyalist territory entered the F. A. I. or
C. N. T. not only for self-protection but also to commit
acts which would disrupt Loyalist- unity and discredit the
Loyalist cause. That the Anarchist organizations opened
their doors wide when the rebellion started is a fact. In...,
deed, whereas the Socialist trade unions made admission
doubly difficult in order to shut out questionable characters who might strive to join to save their skjns, the C'. N. T.
is known to have coerced people to come in. The infiltration
into Anarchist bodies of anti-Loyalists may therefore have
influenced Anarchist policy to some extent, but if it did it
merely accentuated an existing tendency. The moment the
civil war started, the Anarchists, if they had had their
way, would have summarily killed off all persons in any
manner connected with the old social order and have uprooted every capitalist institution. Among the protagonists
of the old order they would certainly have included ' most
bourge~is left Republicans, even though these were
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staunchly anti-Franco and were fightIng as well as they
could on the front. They would have expropriated not only
the big landlords and large industrialists who favored the
rebels but also the petty farmers and small storekeepers~
who, though capitalists, were pro-Loyalist because they
had suffered under the regime of feudal landlordism and
rapacious industrialism.
Actually the Anarchists carried out as much as possible
of this progralu. In Catalonia, their stronghold, and elsewhere too when possible, they confiscated hotels, factories,
bus-lines, taxi companies, etc., and operated them in defiance of the government's endeavors to coordinate business activity. Commercial establishments were placed under
the direction of employees' or workers' committees which
often mismanaged them and reduced the output through
their lack of executive ability, when the prosecution of the
war required maximum production. In villages where
peasants were joyfully dividing sequestrated estates among
themselves, the Anarchists, occasionally at the butt of the
rifle, insisted on the wiping out of individual holdings and
the collective cultivation of land.
Moreover, when justice, as administered by the government, appeared too slow and cautious to the Anarchists,
they did not hesitate to take matters into their own hands.
If there were really fascists in Anarchist ranks, such arbitrary procedure enabled them, under cover of darkness, to
serve their own ends by doing away with friends of the
republic or, by firing off their rifles and throwing hand
grenades .in the dark,' to sow panic and create an impression of chaos.
At the same time Anarchist military units did not acquit
themselves too well at the front. In the early months of the
war, of course, all militiamen ran away from the enemy
on the slightest excuse. They were bad soldiers-because
they were not soldiers at all. But the Anarchists sinned
most frequently in this respect. The Loyalist army began
with very few officers, and the few were untrained. Some
were politically unreliaple, a factor whic~ undoubtedly accounted for a nu:t;nber of military defeats. But whereas
many units accepted the officers sent them and attempted
to introduce some semblance of military discipline, Anarchist units were ruled by soldiers' committees. Whether a
particular formation would execute the commander's orders
and go into battle was decided by a general vote and often
in the negative. Everything was democratic" Ralph Bates,
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the able British novelist and authority on Spain, tells how
he saw Durutti, the beloved Anarchist leader who would
have had the rank of general, s.t anding somewhere about •
hundredth in line with pot and pan waiting for his lunch
while he was in command of thousands of Anarchist soldiers
at the Aragon front. This was typical of an approach
which destroyed much of the value of the Anarchists' presence on the battlefield.
The Anarchists were a problem and sometimes a nuisance, but their profound hold on large sections of the
population, their revolutionary zeal, and the devotion of
their overwhelming maj ority to the Loyalist cause were a
real, and an even greater potential, asset. They were of the
flesh and blood of anti-fascism, and it remained for them
and the other anti-fascists to find a modus vivendi. They
themselves wanted to belong. At the end of September and
the beginning of October, 1936, they~ began to insist on
being taken into the government. No, since they worshiped phrases, they demanded the abolition of the Cabinet
and the creation of a "Counsel of Defense" with strong
Anarchist representation. They would then not have entered a "government"-they were opposed to governments
and Anarchists would not be ministers. Subsequently
they dropped this make-believe and plainly asked ministerial portfolios for their leaders. Within the Popular Front
parties this aroused opposition. It was contended that the
Anarchists lacked a sense of responsibility, that they could
not control their followers, and that they would not cooperate whole-heartedly. Yet the other view prevailed, and
in November, 1936, the Caballero Cabinet was reorganized
to include four Anarchist ministers. The popular Catalan
Anarchist leader, Garcia Oliver, became Minister of Justice. Many Anarchists made an honest effort to collaborate.
The realities of office had a sobering effect. A number of
Anarchist leaders had always been aware of the preeminence of the front. This applied especially to Durutti, who
spent most of his time with the army and helped to instil
military discipline in his Anarchist brigades. Unfortunat~ly, he was killed at Madrid in December.
The left Republicans, Socialists, and Communists saw
the problem as one of focusing Anarchist attention on the
front. A social revolution was jmplicit in the civil war.
Capitalism had already received serious' blows, and the
direction of social trends in the future had been established. To push this too far might mean to destroy it.
1
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Lenin did not collectivize in 1918. What good would fann
collectives and socialized industry be if Franco won? To the
peasant, fascism is a very tangible evil. He identifies it
with landlords, political bosses, and oppressive, reactionary
government. The struggle against these arouses his enthusiasm. It has already brought him concrete benefits.
By May, 1937, seven and a half million acres of estate
lands had been confiscated and distributed. The peasant
will fight like a lion to prevent the landowners from r eturning to power. If the peasants themselves choose to
cultivate their estates collectively, there can be no objection. But ~o superimpose the collective system when the
farmers resist it-as they have in many localities-is unwise. In Russia, too, during the civil war of 1918-21, the
peasants generally sided with the Soviets and enabled the
Bolsheviks to defeat the whites for the negative reason
that the whites would have brought back the landlords. Yet
partly because all Spanish Anarchists had not been converted to this point of view and partly because of the
ancient rivalry between Marxists and Anarchists, the latter continued to concentrate much of their attention on
the rear. In January _a nd February, 1937, three charges
against the Anarchists were heard: that their brigades at
the front often refused to fight, that munitions from the
inadequate gove1,i1ment resources placed in their hands for
fighting Franco were retained in cities behind the lines for
what some Anarchists regarded as an inevitable clash with
Communists and Socialists, and, finally, that by compulsory collectivization, Anarchist groups had forced peasants
in. villages of Catalonia and the Levant provinces to take
up arms against the authorities. On the other hand, Anarchists could get things done when they wanted, and their
aid in transportation and in mobilizing food and other
supplies was frequently appreciated by government departments. At the same time, the ability of the Valencia government to centralize authority in its hands .gradually increased, and arbitrary acts by Anarchists consequently
tended to decrease. Willy-nilly, therefore, there was more
Anarchist collaboration with the government.
A large irreconcilable and non-cooperative Anarchist
faction remained, and especially in Catalonia it was frequently able to dominate the situation. This faction found
comfort and aid. in the Trotskyists of the P.O. U. M.,
which was formed by the Workers' and Peasants' Party,
led by Maurin, and by the Trotskyist Communist opposi43

tion, led by Andres Nin. The P. O. U. M. refused to identify itself with Trotsky's Fourth International and was
prepared, despite the Trotskyist hostility to the United
Front, to participate in a Popular Front government in
Catalonia. But in its general antagonism to collaboration
with liberal-bourgeois anti-fascists and in its insistence on
immediate and complete social revolution (these two p.ositions go hand in hand), the P. O. U. M. is essentially
Trotskyist. Perhaps the sharpest issue was agricultural
collectivization. The Trotskyists had opposed it twelve
years after the successful Soviet revolution in Russia, but
insisted on it in the midst of the Spanish civil war when
victory was still in doubt, and when the socialization of
farming was sure to weaken the pro-Loyalist sentiments
of many peasants whose help was essential to military success. The Trotskyists were strongest in Barcelona. Elsewhere,'" although they had confiscated some hotels, buildings,
and private automobiles in Madrid and other centers, they
were never very numerous. They were, however, well led
and vociferous. They leaned on 'the Anarchists, and because
Anarchist politicaJ thinking was often naive, could influence Anarchist action.
When the war broke out, the two stock Trotskyist arguments militated against the popularity of the P. O. U. M.
One argument was against popular fronts, the other .
against the Soviet Union. In Spain, particularly after
July, 1936, the Popular Front had become a symbol. It
represented the unity without which fascism could not be
vanquished. The Trotskyist op-p osition to the Popular
Front accordingly found a more and more hostile reception
among the masses.
The people likewise frowned on anti-Sovietism. Even
before the broad stream of airplanes and munitions began ~
to flow from the Soviet Union to Spain, Russia was very
popular with all anti-fascists. I arrived in Spain in the
middle of September, 1936, and' took the night train from
Valencia to Madrid. All the coaches were crowded with
soldiers, but I managed to find a bench on which I lay down
and fell asleep. In the middle of the night I was awakened
by a tap on the shoulder, and -when I opened my eyes six
militiamen with rifles stood over me. Their commander,
wea.ring the red-and-black silk neckerchief which marked
him an Anarchist, politely asked me for identification
papers. I showed him the safe conduct I had received from
the Spanish embassy in Paris. He wanted something more.
4
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I showed him my pass from the Valencia provincial government. This too did not suffice.
"Are you an Italian?" he asked.
I said "No."
"Are you German?"

"N 0."
. Then I drew out my passport and said, .."I am a North
American. "
He said, "Fascist or anti-fascist?" I took the passport
from him, opened it, and said, "You see this ? It's a Soviet
visa," and pointed to the sickle and hammer. Then I opened
another page and showed him a second Soviet visa. Then
I opened another page and showed him still another. At
this he raised his hand in the clenched-fist sign and said
"Salud, camarada!" This from an Anarchist a t a time
when Russia had only sent food, clothing, and industrial
raw materials. A few months later Russia was beloved by
all Spaniards who knew that Soviet aid had saved the
Loyalist cause, and everybody knew it because there are no
secrets in Spain. Trotskyist membership dropped accordingly. It had become impossible in Spain to criticize Stalin
as- a counter-revolutionary and nationalist.
The combination of Trotskyists and dissident Anarchists
continued, nevertheless, to give the Loyalist government
considerable anxiety and trouble. Quiet assassinations, the
seizure of arms shipments intended for the front, and open
outbreaks like that in Barcelona in May, 1937, have
diverted the attention of the Valencia Cabinet from its
chief task, the military one. But the left Republicans,
Socialists, and Communists now hold that the secret of
their relationship with the Anarchists lies in a firm policy by a strong government which will preclude any party or
group from attempting to carry out in any part of Loyalist Spain a program opposed to that of the central
government. This explains the formation of the Juan
Negrin Cabinet in May, 1937, to succeed Largo Caballero.
The Anarchists are now expected to behave, and good
behavior will presumably teach them the wisdom of cooperation. Many Anarchists , perhaps the majority, already see the desirability of an aggressive Popular Front
policy. More will be converted to it.
5.

THE QUESTION OF ATROCITIES

These difficulties, and the internal political situation in
Loyalist Spain generally, are the clue to the question of
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atrocities which has received so much prominence in the
press. In like manner the political constellation in the
Franco country explains the murders and executions which
have taken place there. Atrocities have been committed by
both sides. Civil war is a climax of factional hatreds. Yet
it exacerbates these hatreds. The two contending sides
become more sharply demarcated than ever and each openly.
avows its intention of destroying the other. With passions
thus loosed, and especially where volatile, temperamental
Spaniards are concerned, much bloodshed is inevitable. This
is what makes foreign mediation or a truce especially difficult to arrange. The Spanish civil war has been no friendly
picnic. Hosts of marked Loyalists lived in Franco territory, and innumerable partisans of Franco remained within
reach of the Loyalists. These could stab their respective
enemies in the back; each party in the struggle, therefore,
sought to make them harmless. When the rebel ai=m y converged on Madrid, Generall\10Ia, who was at that time in
charge of the operation, frivolously announced that he
was approaching from different points of the compass with
four columns of troops. A "fifth column" of active rebel
sympathizers inside the capital, he stated, would greet and
assist him-when he entered it. What would be more natural,
then, than for the Loyalist government immediately to
seftrch out the suspected members of this "fifth column" and
destroy them. Franco did similar things. 'Vhen he took a
town or village, his special police quickly coralled men and '
women who, according to informants, had borne arms in
the Loyalist ranks, trade-union members who were sure to
be hostile to him and who might engage in sabotage in
factories, and peasants who, by word or de'ed, manifested
their unfriendly attitude. He made short shrift of them
without going carefully into individual cases. Nevertheless,
Douglas Jerrold, a Catholic apologist for Franco, says in
the April, 1937, American Review: "There have been no
atrocities on the Nationalist side . . . there was no need
for them.'" It is good that he writes this way, for no one
now will believe anything else he says.
There are very telling differences between Loyalist
atrocities and rebel atrocities. Rebel atrocities have been
more nun1erous for a simple reason: there were more Loyalist sympathizers in rebel territory than rebel sympathizers
in Loyalist territory. Many reactionaries, landlords, industrialists, and fascists were forewarned and escaped before the
insurrection cOlnmenced, or took advantage of the chaos of
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its early.weeks to flee to districts where Franco held sway or
go abroad. But peasants and workingmen usually do not
have the funds or the private means of transportation for
escape, and the idea, indeed, would rarely occur to them. The
millions of plain people who thus remained exposed to
Franco vengeance far outnumbered those pro-rebels who
fell into the hands of the Loyalists.
Civil war is by definition an attack on established government. It weakens that government, and this was especially true of the weak Madrid government in the summer
of 1936, deprived of an army and the major portion of
its police force and supported py divergent groups which
it could not fully control if they chose to resist control.
Practically all Loyalist atrocities were p erpet rated by individuals or groups acting on their own initiative without
benefit of courts. The period in which such arbitrary acts
were possible lasted for several months. Gradually, however, the authority and police power of the central government grew. It prohibited lawless acts of terror, and the
Loyalist press and radio made propaganda against them.
After a while offenders were punished~ Rebels, spies, and
others of course continued to be arrested by the authorities,
but they were given fair public trials, and opportunities
were granted for appeals against sentences . . Normal
methods of administering justice succeeded the anarchy of
the early period. Loyalist atrocities were thus a concomitant of the disorder that resulted when a small but powerful minority sought to upset a none-too-powerful but popular government. But the number of excesses steadily
tapered off, and befo~e the civil war was six months old,
a trocities as a phenomenon had ceased to exist in Loyalist
Spain. This ' does not mean that isolated assassinations did
not take place.
With Franco, however, atrocities have been continuous
and must remain so. They are not an accident but a permanent policy, a weapon to suppress opposition. Yet that
opposition invariably recurs where it has presumably been
stamped out. Franco foresaw this possibility from the 'Very
beginning. At Tangier on July 29, 1936, he declared to a
correspondent of the London News Chronicle that he would
"save Spain from Marxism at whatever cost."
"That means that you will have to shoot half of Spain?"
the correspondent queried.
Franco replied: "I repeat, at whatever cost."
The rebel terror has taken the form of individual shoot47

ings, small group shootings, and mass executions. The
illustra tions are legion. Writing in the pro-Franco New
York Evening Journal of May 5, 1937, H. R. Knickerbocker said: "Going to the front one day near Santa Olalla
we passed five old women just killed by a fascist fighting
squad, their bodies lying in a ditch. They were peasant
women of the better class, cleanly dressed a~d averaging
about sixty ,years of age.... A little later, in the village
of Alcorcon, we came across the bodies of two youthful
members of the red militia, bound back to back with wire,
and burned alive." But leading a' revolt of minorities
against the people, Frailco has had to introduce a special
terroristic feature-wholesale atrocities. The killing of approximately 2,000 Loyalists by machine-gun in the bull
ring of Badajoz has been accepted as a historical fact.
When the rebels captured Toledo, the government had succeeded in evacuating two hospitals but found no time to
empty the third. Moors, officered by Spaniards, approached
this hospital. The chief physician barred the way. He was
felled by a revolver shot and then the rebel soldiers went
from ward to ward' hand-grenading the wounded in their
beds. Later they killed all the doctors and nurses too. This
is an authentic a ted event which has been related in all its
details in the British House of Commons by members of
Parliament who collected the information. Such mass murders are not isolated episodes. The bombing from airplanes
and shelling of purely civilian sections of Madrid have
gone on month after month when no military objective
could be achieved. This is the major atrocity not only of
the Spanish civil war but of modern times. The annihilation of the Catholic population of Guernica in the Basque
country by German airplanes and the shelling of Almeria
by German warships are too well known to require repetition.
Such large-scale extermination reflects Franco's political
philosophy and his future prospects. The Loyalists, too,
could bomb civilians. It requires no great art to drop missiles on the. excellent target furnished by a large city. In
fact, there has been pressure on the Loyalist government to
retaliate for such deeds as the continued bombing of Madrid
by doing likewise. The government has refused to yield to
this pressure. Its planes have probably killed civilians who
lived in the immediate n~ighborhood of munitions factories,
military airdromes, or railway stations which were the ob. j ects of attack. It is impossible to direct an aerial bomb to an
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exact address. But these cases have been few, and in no instance have Loyalist pilots deliberately taken a civilian
target, whereas Franco's airmen and gunners have done so
repeatedly. There must be a reason for this distinction between the behavior of the two factions. The Loyalist government confidently expects.. when the war is over to govern all
of Spain with the consent of the governed. And it has no .
desire unnecessarily to embitter parts of the population.
Franco knows, however, that if he wins, he can rule only
by means of the iron heel and foreign bayonets. In such
circumstances the opinion of the masses does not count. He
cannot expect to gain their favor anyway. The terror he
engenders by °indiscrilninate shootings makes for the
"peace and order" which observers have noted in Franco
territory. It facilitates the task of administration.
~

6.

!

I

FRANCO'S DILEMMA AND THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME

Franco's problem of finding a sufficient number of Spaniards ready to fight for him and carry him to victory remains insoluble. Without Hitler and Mussolini, Franco
falls. When the question of taking foreign troops . out of
Spain arose, John T. Whitaker, the New York Herald
Tribune's veter~n correspondent, telegraphed from Rome
(May 23, 1937): "The moment for such withdrawal has
not come yet, it is believed here, because without foreign support Franco's forces would succumb to the Spanish
Loyalists." And further, "If Spain were left to the Spaniards, the Loyalist Valencia government would win." Yet
Franco has received infinitely more munitions from abroad
than the Loyalists and has enjoyed in addition the support
of at least 90,000 German and Italian trained soldiers,
whereas the government's International Brigade never consisted of more than 20,000 individual volunteers. °
Despite the fact that the fascist powers shipped whole
regiments to Franco, their presence did not enable hiln to
register very sensational gains. Early in February, .1937,
insurgents captured Malaga, the southern port, and Italy
took full credit for the victory. According to statements
in the Italian press, relayed to the New York Times on
February 10 by its Rome representative, "The backbone
of insurgent General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano's army is
made up of 16,000 Italian soldiers who landed at Cadiz
early in January. Sixty German bombing planes also are
reported to be participating in the operations. It is noteworthy that this report is issued by the official Italian news
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agency, Stefani." But Malaga is very far from the center
of Loyalist military activity, and like Toledo in September,
1936, it was surrendered practically without a serious
struggle, thanks to inefficiency and perhaps also to treachery in the government's General Staff. In March, ho~ever,
when several Italian divisions massed on the Guadalajara
front and attempted completely to encircle Madrid, they
were decisively routed by the Loyalists in the now famous
battle of Brihuega. The government troops took 2,000
Italian prisoners and captured tremendous stores of Italian
army equipment, as well as ' official documents which originated in Rome. Some of the prisoners declared that when
the transports took them from I tali an harbors they
. thought they were going to Ethiopia. Others had been in
East Africa and facsimiles of photographs of naked Abyssinian women found on them, togethe! with voluminous
pictorial evidence of Italian intervention in Spain, were included in a Valencia White Book. The raw militiamen of
yesterday had routed Mussolini's legions. Nor did General
Mola have an easy task in attacking Bilbao, although his
army was heavily reinforced by Germans and Italians and
supported by scores of foreign planes, whereas the Basque
defenders had no airplanes for many weeks and were very
short of guns, munitions, and food.
If Spain were hermetically sealed and non-intervention
made a reality, the legitimate government would win within
a few months. Foreign help! has weighed more with the
rebels than the Loyalists. - If foreigners fighting on both
sides .were withdrawn, the advantage would be on the side
of the Loyalists. That is why Italy, which has larger stakes
in the Mediterranean than Germany, hesitates to forsake
her role as invader of Spain. Spain is a phase of a looming
struggle between the British and Italian empires which
lnay be the feature of the next decade of European history.
l\fussolini is loath to admit defeat. Yet he may be compelled to, for the Spanish civil war has revealed the weaknesses as well as the strength of the fascist countries.
Hitler and Mussolini were in a position to dispatch invaluable assistance to Franco, quickly and without seeking
approval, and then cynically deny that they were doing so.
"rhe dicta tors knew their minds. That was their advantage.
But Spain has served to show that it would be easier to
call the fasoists' bluff than was formerly believed. This
has been their loss. The fighting in Spain indicates that
German and Italian airplanes as well as pilots are inferior
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to Soviet airplanes and pilots. This fact, attested by innUInerable eyewitnesses of air battles over Madrid and
other fronts, has been accepted by the war offices of EuroI)ean countries and has entered into their calculations regarding the imminence of a European war. Moreover, the
disastrous defeat of the Italian divisions at Brihuega undermined Italian military prestige in Europe, and experts
began to mark down the value of Mussolini's arm~ In
Paris, London, and Moscow it is therefore hoped that
Spain may have taught Berlin and Rome a lesson in
caution. They have seen the shortcomings of their armaments and the high quality of those that might be used by
at least one nation against them. Perhaps, too, the Germans were disappointed with their Italian allies, and vice
versa. Having tested their forces in Spain, the fascist
powers may not be as ready to provoke the democracies
as they were before the Spanish civil war started. The
cause of peace is advanced.
With their usual contempt for democracies and "reds,"
Germany and Italy believed that Franco would easily overwhelm the Loyalists and establish a fascist Spain. In the
summer of 1936 they were sure that a few airplane squadrons, some guns and rifles would produce a rebel victory.
Disillusioned but undaunted, they later did not doubt that
the support of tens of thousands of German and Italian
troops would mean that Franco could march through the
country and sweep the foe before him. But when this failed
to materialize, when indeed whole Italian divisions suffered
defeat, the problem assumed a different aspect. Berlin and
Rome now realized that they had undertaken more than
they had bargained for, that this was a major task which
was beginning to drain their resources. It is estimated that
the first seven ' months of the civil war' cost Germany
$200,000,000. And when the wounded started coming back
to Germany from the Spanish front,S, Germans began to
murmur against Hitler's Spanish adventure. The Reichswehr leaders had always opposed Nazi intervention in
Spain as too dangerous and costly. Now the layman who
was missing his butter and eggs and paying more for all
commodities in order presumably that Germany 'might have
guns, began to wonder why he should be pulling in his
belt so that Franco could get those guns. Social discontent,
already a significant phenomenon, grew.
Similar sentiments were noted in Italy. John T. Whitaker, writing from Rome to the New York Herald TribufM
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of May 23, 1937, described the average Italian's reaction
thus: "The Italians, however, are frequently worried about
the situation. The man in the street hears that Italy has
sent 70,000 men to Spain and has spent almost two billion
lire ($105,000,000), and the information does not appeal
to him. After the two-year financial strain caused by Italy's
war with Ethiopia, the Italian people see in the Spanish
strife a deadlock which may last many more months."
Franco's foreign aid, a strain upon the giver yet inadequate for the receiver, has, to make matters even worse,
produced -friction in the rebel camp. The Hitler-MussoliniFranco triangle does not live happily together. The German staff in Spain has on occasions insisted upon one plan
of attack and Franco on another. The Italians have sometimes proposed still a third. There have been bickerings
and quarrels, and once, according to reliable reports, a
pitched battle with many casualties took place near the
Guadarrama Mountains between Nazi troops, taught at
home to believe in their racial superiority, and black Moors.
As H. R. Knickerbocker, who has spent many months with
Franco's army, put it in the New York Evening Journal of
May 1, 1937: "The Germans in Spain despjse the Italians
and detest the Spaniards. The Italians hate the Germans
and loathe the Spaniards. The Spaniards abhor both Italians and Germans and everybody is sick of war."
These disagreements make Franco's prospects look even
worse than they were originally. To help him is like pouring
water into a bottomless barrel. This fact has apparently
impressed itself on Hitler, and Germany, anxious, too, despite the "Berlin-Rome axis" not to offend Great Britain
excessively (England is fast rearming), has grown cooler
toward Franco. Mussolini is more deeply involved, and he ,
has attempted, sometimes by provoking bombing incidents,
to rekindle Berlin's zeal. The prospect cannot seem bright
to II Duce-70,000 Italian soldiers, he must say to himself, have not enabled the rebels to win. Franco will apparently need 100,000 additional Italians for a prolonged
period-perhaps a year-to crush the Loyalists. Can Italy
afford this outlay? To render less assistance means merely
to drag out the war. Yet to render enough for victory may
bring England and France into the conflict. For these
powers could scarcely countenance the intrenchment of an
army of 200,000 Italians in Spain.
Logic, accordingly, would demand that Italy retire, and
this may indeed be history's way of writing "Finis" to the
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Spanish civil war. But there is also a possibility that the
fascist dictators, having failed to help Franco win, may
give him sufficient support to keep him from losing. If
Rome and Berlin each sent twenty-five airplanes a monthand these could easily be flown in, for there is no air patrol
of Spain-Franco could continue to fight for a year unless
revolts completely demolished his rear guard. This method
would be a gamble on some development in the international
or Spanish situation which might turn the tide in favor
of the rebels. The slaughter and destruction would go on
and recuperation would be delayed. This epitomizes the
fate of the classes which Franco represents: they can ruin
Spain but not rule it. If "rule" means to govern to the
advantage of the people, Spain has been misruled for centuries.
Spain will have no peace ·until the elements now fighting
Franco are victorious. The possible course of the civil war
must be judged not by any morning's sensational telegram
but in the larger perspective of historical analogies and
fundamental trends. Napoleon sent gigantic armies into
Spain, hundreds of thousands of men. He devoted years to
an attempt to subdue Spain. He failed. That is an ill omen
for Hitler and l\fussolini. Between 1914 and 1918 Germany
won most of the battles. In the end,- split by internal social
difficulties and faced with an economically superior combination of allies, she lost the war. The map is no exact
mirror of the military situation in Spain. In December
Franco was in the suburbs of Madrid, yet on the verge of
defeat. Not the amount of territory conquered, but the
rna terial, human, and moral resources of the opposing
camps will determine the issue of the conflict. The question
is not simply who pushed whom back in today's fighting
but what the victory, if it was Franco's, cost him in men
and arms and whether it demoralized the Loyalists or
taught them the need of greater discipline and political
cohesion.
Franco's resources are limited. He will have first what he
gets from abroad. He lacks money, and as Mr. Knickerbocker said in Hearst's N ew York Evening Journal, "he
need~ man-power." Knickerbocker stated on l\1:ay 3, ·1937,
that "General Franco has refrained from recruiting heavily
[because] he could not rely on the rank and file of peasants
and workers to the same degree as the reds could with
their promises of heaven on earth for th.e common man."
Thanks to this "promise of heaven on earth for the
53

common man," the Loyalists are forging a mass army
whose fighting qualities, officers, and equipment steadily
improve. They enj oy, moreover, the benefits of a vast financial reserve which, according to a statement made to me
by Gabriel Franco, Minister of Finance in Madrid on April
6, 1986, then amounted to 2,227,000,000 pesetas in gold
and 686,000,000 in silver, and was not much smaller in
September of the same -year.
The Loyalists hold Barcelona, Spain's gl·eatest ~etal
lurgical center, which -a fter numerous difficulties of a technical as well as political nature -is beginning to produce a
widening .flow of munitions. Additional strength likewise
accrues to the Loyalists from the elimination of old army
officers whose devotion to the anti-fascist cause is doubtful.
The presence of these men in the military apparatus has
been responsible for defeats and difficulties at the front.
Finally, the smoothing out of dissension among parties
unalterably committed to the struggle against fascism
would give the Loyalist army greater striking power. The
internal political situation is a complicated one. Yet the
problems it presents need not resist solution interminably.
The outstanding fact is that the Valencia government's
reserves of strength are far from used up. Indeed, they
have barely been scratched. The Loyalists have not yet
exploited all possibilities of improving their position. Time,
therefore, plays into their hands. As the months go by,
not exhaustion but an intensification of effort, greater
firmness of purpose, and warmer popular enthusiasm characterize the legitimate government's activities. ,I t lost much
time getting started, whereas the rebels, having taken the
initiative, were early prepared to deliver a series of quick
blows. Franco has lost that advantage. ~is situation becomes increasingly difficult. The government, on the other
hand, is continually opening up new pockets of energy.
It feels certain of ultimate success.
The outcome of the civil war will have far-reaching repercussions on international affairs and on world social
developments. But intertwined with these is the paramount
. issue--Spain's future. Will Spain lie prostrate, chained by
oppressors and smothered in the ashes of her cities and the
rivers of congealed blood that have been added to her former misery? Or will the Spanish nation rise revitalized,
fatigued but inspired by a new sense of self-confidence?
For the first time in centuries the people themselves are
shaping their fate in the civil war. They will insist on
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doing so when it is ended. The social upheaval that accompanies the fighting has caused a ferment that will not soon
stop. Millions who thought of themselves as akin to pack
animals, robots that dug the earth or tended machines,
have now become keenly aware of the role they can and
should play in molding their life and that of their country.
This realization, in a revolutionary era, is the psychological
spark which releases endless quantities of physical and intellectual power for the task of national transformation.
New strata of humanity, previously separated from light
by a thin crust of aristocracy and plutocracy, are churned
up to the surface and demand work and opportunity.
Franco would have to stamp them back into the depths
agaIn.
Spain has been waiting, too patiently, for this awakening. She is rich in talent and natural resources, and can
contribute much more than she has contributed to Europe
and to mankind. The Loyalist leaders, especially Juan
Negrin, grow excited and eloquent when they touch the
subject of Spain's upbnilding under a new regime. Engineers will dam the rivers and spread life-giving waters over
the sun-baked fields of Castile, Andalusia, and Estremadura to increase their crops and give more food, health,
and education to a suffering peasantry. Railways and ports
must be developed, mountains explored for mineral treasures, and known deposits so worked that the country as a
whole and not a privileged few may benefit. The unspoiled,
freshly upturned layers of society will draw new wealth
from the earth. More industries will rise to employ the
energies of the people and bring them comfort, pleasure,
and leisure. Spain will come back into Europe and help to
remake Europe.
When death ceases on the battlefield, a nation will be
reborn. Only this could justify all the carnage. For Spain
to revert to her feudal sleep would mock the dead and torture the living.
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